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ame theory had its beginnings in eco-
nomics as a separate topic of analysis,
practiced by a cadre of specialists. It has
since become commonplace. Every econo-
mist is acquainted with the basic ideas, often
without notice, and there is free movement
between the use of game theory and other
techniques. This incorporation as a standard
economic tool has helped shape the nature
of game theory itself—the mix of questions
has changed and more attention has been
devoted to how game theoretic models are
to be interpreted as capturing economic
interactions.
Mathematical economics and economet-
rics have each similarly progressed from
being a topic pursued by a band of specialists
to becoming a sufficiently familiar tool as to
be used without comment. In the process,
each has been shaped by issues arising in
economic applications.
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Experimental economics is currently
making its transition from topic to tool.1
Once viewed skeptically by many econo-
mists, experiments have become common-
place. Once again, this transition has
involved changes both in the way econo-
mists view experimental methods and in the
experimental methods themselves.
This paper explores one aspect of this
integration of experimental economics into
economics. How can we usefully combine
work in economic theory and experimental
economics? What do economic theory and
experimental economics have to contribute
to one another, and how can we shape their
interaction to enhance these contributions?
There is already plenty of work 
that insightfully integrates theory and 
1 For example, the Journal of Economic Literature’s
“Mathematical and Quantitative Methods” classification
section includes a “Design of Experiments” subsection,
and a Nobel prize has been given for experimental work.
At the same time, training in experimental methods has
not yet joined basic econometrics or game theory as a stan-
dard part of the first-year graduate curriculum. Alvin E.
Roth (1993) provides a history of early work in experimen-
tal economics. Roth (1995) continues this history and pro-
vides a more detailed discussion of recent experimental
work. Roth (1991) proceeds further with some thoughts on
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experiments.2 However, the methods for put-
ting the two together are still developing. The
goal here is to examine the issues involved in
this development. Much can be gained by
combining economic theory and experiments,
but doing so calls for thinking carefully about
the way we do theory as well as experiments.
2. An Example
It is helpful to begin with an example in
which experimental results and economic the-
ory have constructively mingled. This exam-
ple illustrates the ideas that will be developed
more generally in section 3, illustrated in 
section 4, and then extended in section 5.
In 1965, Reinhard Selten (1965) intro-
duced the concept of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Subgame perfection is now
taken for granted, in the sense that a paper
whose conclusion hinged upon an equilibri-
um that was not subgame perfect would
have a great deal of explaining to do.
Some years later, Werner Güth, Rolf
Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982)
performed a simple experiment, examining
what has come to be known as the ultimatum
game. Player 1 makes a proposal for how a
sum of money is to be split between players 1
and 2. Player 2 then either accepts, imple-
menting the proposal, or rejects, in which case
the interaction ends with zero payoffs for each.
This is the type of game—perfect information,
two players, only one move per player—in
which subgame perfection is often viewed as
being obviously compelling. In any subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum game,
player 1 makes and player 2 accepts a propos-
al that gives player 2 at most one penny (or one
of whatever is the smallest monetary unit
available). In contrast, Güth, Schmittberger,
and Schwarze obtained results that have been
echoed by an ever-growing list of subsequent
2 Vincent P. Crawford (1997) and Roth (1988) explore
the interaction between economic theory and experi-
ments, each arguing (as does this paper) that there are
good reasons for thinking about experiments when doing
economic theory as well as thinking about theory when
doing experiments.
studies. The modal proposal is typically to split
the sum of money evenly. If player 1 asks for
two-thirds or more of the surplus, he stands a
good chance of being rejected.
We thus have a marked contrast between
theory and experiment. A common initial
reaction was to dismiss the laboratory envi-
ronment as uninteresting. Why should we be
interested in how experimental subjects play
an artificial game for token amounts of
money? Borrowing a term from experimen-
tal psychology, this is a question of external
validity: is the experimental environment
sufficiently close to the situation of interest
to be informative? In this case, for example,
is the laboratory environment close enough
to the situations envisaged by contract theo-
rists when they assume that subgame-per-
fect equilibria appear in the ultimatum
games embedded in their models?
One way of gaining some perspective on
such questions is to turn them around. How
special is the laboratory environment generat-
ing the experimental results? Can we link the
results to aspects of the experimental envi-
ronment that appear to be especially artificial,
or do they appear to be robust? In the case of
the ultimatum game, a long string of experi-
ments has investigated the effects of playing
for larger amounts of money, playing in dif-
ferent countries and cultures, playing with
differing degrees of anonymity, playing with
different amounts of experience, playing
games of different length, and playing with
different types of opponents.3 Some of these
3 For example, Lisa A. Cameron (1999), Elizabeth
Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe and Vernon L. Smith (1996),
and Robert L. Slonim and Roth (1998) (larger payoffs);
Joseph Henrich (2000), Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel
Bowles, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and
Richard McElreath (2001), and Roth, Vesna Prasnikar,
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Shmuel Zamir (1991) (dif-
ferent countries and cultures); Gary E. Bolton and Rami
Zwick (1995), Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996), and
Hoffman, McCabe, Shachet, and Smith (1994) (anonymi-
ty); David Cooper, Nick Feltovich, Roth, and Zwick (2002)
(experience); Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E.
Savin, and Martin Sefton (1995) and Glenn W. Harrison
and McCabe (1992) (length); and Sally Blount (1995),
Harrison and McCabe (1996), and Eyal Winter and Zamir
(1997) (opponents).
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variations matter, and there is much to be
learned about which matter more than oth-
ers. However, no combination of conditions
has been found that produces the subgame-
perfect equilibrium outcome sufficiently
reliably as to allow us to dismiss the remain-
ing experimental results. The mounting evi-
dence suggests that the ultimatum game has
something to tell us about behavior. One can
often find reasons to dismiss any single
experiment, but cannot ignore such a large
and varied body of work.
Attention then turns to the theory. What
implications for economic theory do the
experimental results have? Perhaps none. We
know that any theory is a deliberate approxi-
mation, and hence that there must be some
circumstances under which it fails. Could it
be that the theory is meant for settings not
captured by the experiments, and that the
theory is still useful in the applications for
which it is intended? In this spirit, Ken
Binmore, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton
(1985) argue that the ultimatum game fea-
tures an atypically asymmetric division of bar-
gaining power, making subgame perfection
unrealistically demanding, and that models
built around subgame perfection might be a
better match for two-stage bargaining games
that feature a less extreme (though still asym-
metric) distribution of bargaining power.
Their experiments produced outcomes much
closer to the subgame-perfect equilibrium in
two-stage bargaining games. Are we then to
assume that the subgame-perfect equilibrium
is a useful model of behavior in bargaining
models, as long as we stay away from models
with equilibria that are too asymmetric? And
if so, what does “too asymmetric” mean?
Once again, we can seek insight in the
ensuing body of experimental work.
Subsequent experiments have examined bar-
gaining games with varying degrees of asym-
metry in bargaining power (see Douglas D.
Davis and Charles A. Holt [1993] for a sum-
mary). Departures from equilibrium are
often much less pronounced than in the ulti-
matum game, but the data still does not
invariably reflect equilibrium play. However,
we do not expect theories to make exact pre-
dictions. How close is close enough? When
are experimental results within the margin of
approximation that is inevitably built into a
theory, and when do they indicate that the
theory is on the wrong track? There is typi-
cally no obvious standard for answering these
questions. One can then imagine Davis and
Holt’s summary figure (Figure 5.6) being
regarded as evidence for both the success
and the failure of conventional bargaining
models, depending upon one’s point of view.
A return to the theory is again helpful, this
time with an eye toward finding within the
theory some guide for evaluating the experi-
mental results. Glen W. Harrison (1989,
1992) (see also Robert Drago and John S.
Heywood [1989]) suggests one approach. A
cornerstone of the relevant theory is that peo-
ple maximize their expected payoffs. In light
of this, a natural measure for evaluating the
theory is the payoff losses subjects incur as a
result of not behaving as predicted. The larg-
er are these losses, the stronger is the evi-
dence that the theory has missed something.
Harrison argues that in the case of auctions,
seemingly large departures from equilibrium
behavior often translate into very small payoff
losses, suggesting that the contrast between
theory and behavior is not nearly as large as it
first appears. Drew Fudenberg and David K.
Levine (1997) turn a similar eye toward a
variety of other games, including the ultima-
tum game. They find that behavior in many
of these games is consistent with subjects’
holding beliefs about others’ behavior that is
consistent with their experience and against
which they suffer relatively small payoff loss-
es. This again suggests that the theory may
capture important elements of behavior,
despite seemingly unencouraging experi-
mental results. At the same time, however,
payoff losses in the ultimatum game are rela-
tively large compared to many other experi-
ments. Rejecting an offer often involves a
significant sacrifice, regardless of what one
believes about how others are playing. It is
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4 In spirit, this is close to asking how far realized pay-
offs fall short of the payoffs that could be obtained by play-
ing a best response. The difference is that the incentives
for adjusting one’s behavior are now taken to be not the
payoffs promised by perfect optimization, but rather the
incentives to pursue the potentially imperfect learning
process that shapes behavior.
5 See Camerer (2003) and Drew Fudenberg and David
K. Levine (1998) for examples. Raymond Battalio,
Samuelson, and John Van Huyck (2001) report an experi-
ment linking the speed of learning and the incentives for
adjusting one’s strategy, providing some hint that learning
can be important.
then harder to argue here that one can
rationalize nonequilibrium behavior simply
by arguing that the players are nonetheless
achieving approximately equilibrium payoffs.
Binmore, John Gale, and Larry
Samuelson (1995) and Alvin E. Roth and
Ido Erev (1995) suggest an alternative
approach to assessing how close observed
behavior is to the predictions of the theory.
Why should we expect equilibrium behavior
in the first place? The traditional answer in
economics is not that equilibria spring to
life as a result of sheer calculation or exter-
nal organization, but rather that behavior is
pushed toward equilibrium by an adjust-
ment or learning process that continually
puts pressure on players to alter nonequilib-
rium behavior. Adopting this view, how
strong are the incentives for players to
adjust nonequilibrium behavior in simple
bargaining games?4 The stronger are these
incentives, the stronger is the experimental
evidence that the theory has missed some-
thing. In the case of bargaining games, it
turns out that these incentives can be quite
weak. Even small amounts of noise or
imperfection can cause the learning process
to get stuck, for long or even indefinite peri-
ods of time, far away from a neighborhood
of the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We
thus again have a suggestion that the
observed behavior may not be too far from
equilibrium, by at least one measure of “too
far.” Motivated by similar considerations, a
literature on learning and its relationship 
to experimental behavior has developed.5
However, two difficulties now arise. First,
6 Ed Hopkins (2002) provides an indication of why it
can be difficult to identify the learning process behind
experimental behavior.
what can the subjects, especially respon-
ders, possibly have to learn in a game so
simple as the ultimatum game? Without a
clear answer to this question, learning mod-
els are difficult to interpret. We return to
this question in section 5. Second, learning
theories have proven to be cumbersome
tools with which to examine strategic inter-
actions. A successful theory trades off its
explanatory power with its ease of use. It has
not been easy to formulate learning models
that rival equilibrium theories in terms of
readily yielding sharp predictions.6
Perhaps one should view the connection
between theory and experiment differently.
Instead of asking whether the theory gets
the behavior right, and then wrangling over
how the distance between experimental
and theoretical outcomes is to be measured
and interpreted, let us ask whether the the-
ory captures the important considerations
shaping the behavior. This directs attention
away from the point predictions of the the-
ory and toward its comparative statics. For
example, experimental behavior that con-
sistently responds to changes in discount
rates as predicted by the theory of bargain-
ing might lead us to believe that the theory
has identified an important role for impa-
tience in shaping behavior, even if the the-
ory is not complete enough to capture
every aspect of behavior. This emphasis on
comparative statics pushes experimental
analysis closer to methods familiar in other
areas of economics.
The results in this respect for bargaining
theory are mixed. For example, Binmore,
Peter Morgan, Shaked, and Sutton (1991)
and Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989)
report experiments in which behavior
responds to the difference between a volun-
tarily exercised and involuntarily exercised
outside option in a direction consistent with
theoretical predictions. However, Jack Ochs
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7 The contrast between these two results becomes
sharper in the context of section 4, which suggests that one
should be especially disappointed when a theory fails to
exhibit behavior integral to its original structure, such as
the appropriate sensitivity to discount rates, but especially
pleased when the theory successfully extends to originally
novel questions, such as the effect of outside options.
and Roth (1989) report an experiment in
which behavior does not respond to the dis-
count factor and the length of the game con-
sistently with the predictions of subgame
perfection. This latter finding is all the more
disconcerting because the role of impatience
is viewed as one of the key insights of non-
cooperative bargaining models.7 These
results suggest that rates of impatience may
be less central, and the prospect of a break-
down in negotiations more important, than
captured by the original models.
Taken together, the body of experimental
evidence suggests that our simplest theories
of bargaining leave some aspects of behav-
ior unexplained. This is interesting, but is
most useful if the experiments also suggest
how we might construct a more encompass-
ing account of behavior. This brings us to
the question, again borrowed from experi-
mental psychology, of internal validity. How
do we assess whether our interpretation of
an experimental result captures the rele-
vant aspects of the experimental situation
and the resulting behavior, and hence
points the way to a better understanding of
the behavior and to better theoretical mod-
els of that behavior? For example, Güth,
Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) (see
also Güth and Reinhard Tietz [1982]) inter-
pret their results as indicating that subjects’
behavior is shaped primarily by considera-
tions of fairness. If this is the case, then we
may be on the road to a new “fairness theo-
ry” of behavior. We might work with famil-
iar bargaining models, but with quite
different views of how people behave in
these models. Notice that this assessment
differs markedly from the hints with which
the previous paragraph concluded, under
which we would retain the basic view of
8 Prasnikar and Roth (1992) investigate these possibili-
ties by examining a market game in which asymmetric
equilibrium outcomes appear that do not Pareto dominate
the symmetric outcomes.
self-interested behavior but revise the
structure of the model.
An appeal to fairness has an intuitive ring
to it. It is hard to believe that fairness does
not play a role in our lives, or that extreme-
ly asymmetric allocations would not strike
one as unfair. It also seems quite natural
that these considerations would carry over
into behavior in bargaining experiments.
Here, however, we return to a theme that
appeared in connection with learning mod-
els and that runs throughout this essay. The
relevant question for evaluating a theory is
not so much whether it is “correct,” but
whether it can be readily and usefully
applied to a sufficiently broad range of set-
tings. The difficulty with appeals to fairness
is that they too often have an “I know it
when I see it” quality that makes them par-
ticularly cumbersome to use. Vesna
Prasnikar and Roth (1992) develop this
idea, reporting experimental results show-
ing that, under some circumstances, experi-
mental subjects do settle on extremely
asymmetric allocations (see also James
Andreoni, Paul M. Brown, and Lise
Vesterlund [2002] and Harrison and Jack
Hirshleifer [1989]). This appears to suggest
that we have been too hasty in concluding
that concerns for fairness routinely push
people away from asymmetric allocations.
However, the extreme allocations in
Prasnikar and Roth’s best-shot game Pareto
dominate the less asymmetric allocations. In
response, it is tempting to refine the notion
of fairness, viewing it as inducing an antipa-
thy to asymmetric allocations, but an antipa-
thy that is tempered when asymmetric
allocations have efficiency properties that
symmetric allocations lack. Adding the best-
shot experimental results to our portfolio
may thus suggest that fairness is important
after all, but is a more subtle notion than
simply a concern for equality or symmetry.8
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There is much that is appealing about this
argument, but it illustrates the difficulties of
working with such an elusive concept as
fairness. The more subjective or context-
dependent is the idea of fairness, the less
useful it becomes as a component of a the-
ory, regardless of how important it is in
shaping behavior.
Making progress in interpreting seeming-
ly anomalous experimental results thus
requires making the idea of fairness, or
whatever else it is that one imagines affect-
ing players’ behavior, sufficiently precise. A
first question is theoretical: can we do so
with conventional theoretical techniques, or
are we dealing with something quite differ-
ent? Are we dealing with a world to which
the underlying structure of economic mod-
els applies—people maximize, they bal-
ance competing objectives, they respond
to variations in the constraints on how
these objectives can be traded against one
another—even if they are concerned with
something other than simply how much
money they make? Or are such models of
behavior simply on the wrong track?
Andreoni and John Miller (2002) provide
some insight into this question through
experiments in which a dictator faces a vari-
ety of exchange rates between the payoffs
that the dictator can keep or allocate to a
recipient (while Andreoni, Marco Castillo,
and Ragan Petrie [2003] do much the same
for the ultimatum game). As is often the case
in such games, their results are not consis-
tent with the proposition that all subjects
care only about how much money they
receive. However, their results are consis-
tent with the claim that most subjects have
stable preferences satisfying revealed-pref-
erence axioms. Whatever motivates the sub-
jects, whether money or fairness or
something else, it is something that we can
model with the familiar optimization tools of
economics, without abandoning rational
behavior as a unifying principle.
The next task is again theoretical: fitting
some more encompassing model of individual
9 Among others, Ken Binmore, John McCarthy,
Giovanni Ponti, Samuelson, and Avner Shaked (2002) and
Armin Falk, Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher (2003) report
experimental results indicating that preferences must
depend upon more than simply payoffs, even the payoffs
of all players.
behavior into standard models of bargain-
ing. Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
(2000) and Ernst Fehr and Klaus M.
Schmidt (1999) (see also Bolton [1991])
offer models of preferences that capture a
concern for fairness. Each is centered
around a utility function that involves one’s
own payoff and the payoff of one’s oppo-
nent, and that exhibits some aversion to
payoff inequality.
One tempting reaction to these models is
that nothing so simple could possibly cap-
ture the complexity of human behavior.
Pursuing this view, it is not hard to find evi-
dence that some factors are missing from
these models.9 However, such criticisms
miss the point. It is again important to recall
that one purpose of any theory is to judi-
ciously choose considerations to neglect.
The ability to find some circumstances in
which the theory does not work perfectly is
then not by itself cause to reject the theory.
While they may still be incomplete, the
models offered by Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have
the key virtue that their predictions are clear
and they can easily be extended to encom-
pass novel situations. This allows us to con-
firm that these models predict behavior
matching that of standard models in a wide
variety of circumstances in which the latter
appear to be applicable, to confirm that they
capture the apparent fairness considerations
that operate in the bargaining models that
motivated their construction, and to investi-
gate the extent to which they apply to new
applications. This is just what we need to
make progress, and is what economic theory
must do if we are to effectively combine 
theory and experiments.
A variety of alternative and more elaborate
models have appeared, many enriching the
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10 Bolton (1991) offers an early model in which prefer-
ences depend upon others’ payoffs, while Matthew Rabin
(1993), building on the theory of psychological games
(John Geanakoplos, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti
[1989]), is an early example of how one might make the
idea of fairness theoretically operational. Other examples
include Gary Charness and Rabin (2002), Martin
Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger (2004), Fehr and
Simon Gächter (2000), Levine (1998), and Uzi Segal and
Joel Sobel (2003). Andreoni and Samuelson (2003) report
experimental results that explore, in a somewhat different
setting, some of the key features of these models.
11 This discussion thus avoids questions concerning the
existence of an objective reality have been raised from
widely differing perspectives. Physicists argue that quan-
tum phenomena are not determined independently of
attempts to measure them, while some social scientists
argue that nothing objective exists independently of the
observer, who constructs reality as she observes it. Such
concerns can be relevant for economics. For example,
could experimental procedures designed to elicit valua-
tions affect those valuations? We return to this set of issues
in section 5.1.
theory by incorporating elements in prefer-
ences beyond simply the final allocation of
payoffs.10 There is considerable work to be
done in assessing and synthesizing these
models, work that will require a continual
interplay between economic theory and
experiments. How is this interplay to pro-
ceed? It will be helpful to develop some of
the ideas raised in the course of this example
more generally.
3. A Theoretical Perspective
This section opens a more general discus-
sion with a theoretical perspective, in the
form of a model of economic theory and
economic experiments. The idea is to pro-
vide a precise way of talking about what a
theory is, what an experiment is, and how
the two might be related.
3.1 A Model
The environment. The model begins
with the assumption that there is an objective
environment or “real world” to be studied,
represented by a function
where X and S are finite sets and X∞ and
F:, XS    →
12 Again, the model skirts a philosophical issue, con-
cerning whether the world is deterministic or random. We
adopt the technical convenience that outcomes are deter-
ministic (conditional on being able to identify the situation
completely), though in practice we can identify only finite
approximations of situations, with outcomes that then
appear to be random (conditional on this information).  A
random-world view requires only additional notation in
order to accommodate an extra layer of probability distri-
butions in the model.
13 The sets X∞ and S∞ can be viewed as a short-hand
for sets that are finite but prohibitively large. Daniel C.
Dennett’s Library of Mendel (1995) provides the setting
for an intriguing discussion of large finite sets.
S∞ are their infinite-dimensional prod-
ucts.11 We think of the function F as taking
in information, given by an element of the
set X∞, that defines a situation of interest.
This information might define an exten-
sive-form game, or a set of lotteries from
which one is to choose, or a market or an
economy. With each such situation, the
function F associates an output from the
set S∞.12 Depending on the situation, this
output might be an equilibrium of the
game, or a selected lottery, or a market
price or a competitive equilibrium.
We  can view each of the dimensions of
X∞ and S∞ as corresponding to a property
or characteristic that a situation or an output
might have, with the sets X and S providing
the language in which one describes such
properties. The details of the sets X and S
are not particularly important. What does
matter is that there is a potentially endless
list of relevant properties, sufficiently many
that neither theoretical nor experimental
work could ever hope to describe every
aspect of reality. We ensure this in the
model by assuming that there are infinitely
many such properties, so that the sets of
inputs and outputs are the infinite products
X∞ and S∞.13
We think of the environment as generat-
ing situations which are then transformed
into outcomes by the function F.W el e t 
denote a probability distribution describing
the process that generates situations. We
think of a theory or an experiment as being
a tool for understanding the function F.I n
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14 While it is intuitive that a theory cannot make use of
all the information in the environment, there is in princi-
ple no reason why it should be restricted to the first N
dimensions of X∞. Why not a theory that makes use of the
information in dimensions 1, 3, and 14 and ignores the
rest? There is no loss in assuming that, whatever theory
we have, the dimensions of X∞ are arranged so that the
theory makes use of an initial string of them.
the absence of any constraints, of course,
one would simply work with F itself.
Unfortunately, the function F is too com-
plicated to work with directly. The idea is
then to combine theory and experimental
work to produce tools that are simple
enough to be used, while capturing enough
of F to be useful.
Theory. Like the function F that
describes the environment, a theory takes in
information concerning a situation and pro-
vides information concerning the correspon-
ding outcome. However, instead of taking in
all of the information contained in an ele-
ment of the set X∞, we model the theory as
making use only of the dimensions 1,…,N,
for some finite N. Similarly, instead of speci-
fying every detail of the output, the theory
provides information only about the dimen-
sions 1,…, M, for some finite M. Let X
N be
the set of N-tuples corresponding to the first
N dimensions of the set X∞, and let S
M simi-
larly be M-tuples whose elements corre-
spond to the first M dimensions of S∞. A
theory is then a function
for some N and M, where ∆S
M is the set of
probability measures over S
M and  ∆∆S
M is
the set of probability measures over ∆S
M.
The restriction to finite N and M captures
the fact that a theory does not make use of
all of the information defining a situation,
nor does it specify every detail of the out-
put.14 Instead, one of the challenges in
crafting a theory is to choose its inputs and
outputs, i.e., to choose N and M,s oa st o
include relevant information and neglect
relatively unimportant details. For example,
a theory about labor force participation
fX S
NM :, →   
15 The idea that the theory produces a distribution over
outcomes is perhaps most familiarly exploited by weather
forecasters, who regularly announce probabilities of rain,
but also appears routinely in economics. We return to this
idea in section 4.1.2.
rates may use information on wage rates,
marital status, age and educational attain-
ment, but may neglect information concern-
ing foreign exchange rates. The theory’s
output may provide information about how
much time an individual devotes to leisure,
but may say nothing about which activities
consume this time.
As a first approximation, we might think of
the theory as choosing an output from S
M.
However, given that the theory’s input leaves
some details of the situation unspecified, it is
more natural to view the theory as produc-
ing a probability distribution over the out-
puts in S
M (i.e., an element of ∆S
M). We then
interpret the random output as reflecting
the uncontrolled realization of those aspects
of the situation that are not captured by X
N.
For example, a theory of labor force partici-
pation may provide an expected participa-
tion rate, as a function of an individual’s age
and education, but would view actual partic-
ipation as being randomly distributed
around this expected value, reflecting other,
unobserved characteristics.15
It is useful to go one step further and
allow the theory to produce an element of
∆∆S
M, the space of distributions over distri-
butions. We may have more information
concerning the likely values and implica-
tions of some of the unmodeled features of
a situation than of others. We may then
have a distribution over the realizations of
the features about which we have relatively
good information, each in turn inducing a
distribution over outcomes. For example,
an analyst asked to predict the outcome of
the next presidential election might begin
with the question of whether the economy
will then be healthy or in recession. The
analyst’s theory may involve a distribution
over which of these is likely to be the case
and, conditional on either, a distribution
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16 Hence, the input is drawn from the set 
{x∞ ∈ X∞ : x∞(n)   x
N(n), n   1,…,N}.
over likely outcomes of the election.
Similarly, an economist asked to analyze
the market for skilled labor might begin
with a distribution over likely macroeco-
nomic conditions, each of which in turn
induces a distribution over conditions in
the relevant labor market. In a model of
labor force participation, one’s education
and age may induce a distribution over par-
ticipation decisions that itself depends ran-
domly on labor market conditions. Who is
to say whether the probability that the
weather forecaster attaches to rain is not
itself chosen randomly?
Experiments. An experiment similarly
associates an output with an input. The
experiment again begins with an element
of X
N (for some finite N), which we denote
by  x
N and refer to as the experimental
design. This design fixes those features of
the environment captured in the N dimen-
sions of X
N. For example, the design x
N may
specify how much money the subjects earn
in various circumstances.
The actual input to the experiment is a sit-
uation, i.e. an element of X∞ (denoted by
x∞), that matches x
N on the first N dimen-
sions.16 The idea here is that the experimen-
tal design fixes those details of the
environment described by x
N, while leaving
others uncontrolled. For example, the
design may leave uncontrolled the wealth
levels of the subjects.
Let  F
M denote the function comprising
the first M dimensions of F. Given an
experimental design x
N and a corresponding
input  x∞, the experiment consists of an
observation of the form:
F
M(x∞)
for some M. Hence, an experiment consists
of a partial description (F
M(x∞)) of the out-
put of the function F that describes the
environment, evaluated at one of a collec-
tion of possible inputs (x∞ ∈ X∞) that share
17 An experiment may yield many observations, but we
can arrange the notation to represent the entire experi-
mental outcome as a single observation. This model
ignores an issue raised by Roth (1994): the tendency to
concentrate on “successes” when reporting experimental
results can cause useful information to be neglected. A
report of a successful experiment, whether it involves a
seeming confirmation or contradiction of a theory, may be
less informative than a report that also details the process
leading to that experiment. The latter may include investi-
gations of alternative games, alternative experimental pro-
cedures, alternative presentations of the experiment to the
subjects, and so on. As Roth notes, the line between hav-
ing also run alternative (possibly unsuccessful) experi-
ments and having run pilot or diagnostic trials is often
ambiguous, so that even the best of intentions do not
ensure the optimal provision of information. The discus-
sion here assumes that this problem has been solved, so
that we have precisely the information we would want
from an experiment, and then asks how we combine that
information with economic theory.
18 For example, the experiment may involve university
undergraduates choosing between small-stakes lotteries
while we may be interested in risk attitudes among large
traders in financial markets.
the features (x
N) determined by the 
experimental design.17
It may seem counterintuitive to character-
ize the experiment as yielding realizations of
F, since experiments are often viewed as
(and criticized for) being artificial rather
than “real.” However, a more precise formu-
lation of this criticism is that the experimen-
tal situation involves a value of x
N that is not
precisely the one in which we are most
interested.18 But given this value, the output
is given by F
M(x∞) for some x∞ that matches
x
N on the relevant dimensions.
There are many situations x∞ consistent
with an experimental design x
N,a smust be
the case when we are unable to specify
every detail of the experimental situation.
One hopes the experimental design deter-
mines most of the important aspects of the
situation, but cannot control all of the
dimensions of the experimental situation
x∞.I neffect, the experiment is a model of a
situation, just as is a theory. The output of an
experiment is similarly a model, given by
F
M(x∞) rather than F(x∞). We can hope to
identify the salient points of the experimen-
tal outcome, but again cannot identify
everything.
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The Goal. The goal of both theoretical
and experimental work is to understand the
world, or in the context of our model, to
understand the function F. How can eco-
nomic theory, often seemingly quite
removed from the world, be combined with
experiments in pursuit of this goal?
It is not easy to make this goal more pre-
cise. How do we know when we have
achieved some understanding of F? We
might judge our understanding by the abili-
ty to make predictions that match the out-
puts generated by F. For example, Erev,
Roth, Robert L. Slonim, and Greg Barron
(2002) pose the following question. Suppose
we have both a theory and some experimen-
tal evidence bearing on a question of eco-
nomic behavior, perhaps making different
predictions and each potentially subject to
error. How do we combine the two to reach
a more precise, joint prediction?
The perspective of this paper is different.
Instead of asking how we use existing theo-
retical and experimental results to make pre-
dictions, our focus will be on how we can
exploit experimental results in the develop-
ment of more useful theory, and vice versa.
We thus shift the emphasis from using exist-
ing theory and experiments in making pre-
dictions to using them in making new theory
and experiments.
To be meaningful, of course, this process
must be organized by the ultimate goal of
understanding the world. At this point, we
confront new difficulties. While we might
hope that a theory’s predictions will be close,
we again cannot expect them to be exact.
Then how are we to judge whether a new
theory is an improvement? This would be
straightforward if there were only benefits
and no costs to enhancing the predictive
power of a theory, but this is not the case.
We return to this issue in section 3.2.
More importantly, the ability to make pre-
dictions is only part of what is involved in
using economic theory to understand the
world. Robert J. Aumann (1985) and Ariel
Rubinstein (1998), for example, argue that
while the ability to predict behavior may be
a good test of our understanding of the
world, the ultimate goal is the understanding
itself. Economic theory can then be helpful
in making precise our intuition and estab-
lishing relationships between our ideas, even
without adding to our predictive abilities.
This is a popular view, but one that makes it
all the harder to identify the criteria by
which theory is to be evaluated.
3.2 Why Experiments?
How do experiments help us assess and
design economic theory? It is useful to start
by considering the limitations of economic
theory, organized around four ideas:
• Economic theory may be inaccurate:
given an input x
N ∈ X
N, the theory f(x
N)
may produce distributions over outputs
that do not match the distribution
induced by the environment. Hence,
given the information on which it condi-
tions and the results it predicts, the the-
ory provides a result that we would
change if we knew the true model.
• Economic theory may be imprecise: the
theory may produce a random output of
sufficient noisiness to be unhelpful. If
possible, we might then seek more preci-
sion by increasing N to encompass more
information than that captured by X
N,
bringing more of the relevant variation in
the situation within the purview of the
model.
• Economic theory may be uninformative:
important information may be missing
from the output of the theory. We may
then need to expand the range of the
theory (increase M).
• Economic theory can be too complicated:
if the vectors N and M are large, then the
informational demands of the theory
may be so burdensome as to make the
theory useless.
In practice, we must expect these cate-
gories to blur together, with any particular
theory exhibiting some degree of each
shortcoming.
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19 This falls into Roth’s (1987) category of “Whispering
in the Ears of Princes.”
20 This falls into Roth’s (1987) category of “Speaking to
Theorists.”
21 See Camerer (1995) and Roth (1995) for surveys.
How can economic experiments help
address the shortcomings of economic the-
ory? First, experiments can fill the gap
when the theory is either too uninformative
or too complicated to be useful.19 For
example, the role of economists in design-
ing and running Federal Communications
Commission spectrum auctions in the
United States, and subsequently throughout
the world, has been offered as evidence for
the usefulness of economic theory. Before
running the auctions, however, the FCC
commissioned experiments (spearheaded
by Charles R. Plott) to explore their proper-
ties (cf. Paul Milgrom 2004). These experi-
ments played an important role in verifying
the internal consistency of the auction pro-
cedure and in making the case that the auc-
tion could work. Experiments were
similarly important in designing the British
spectrum auctions (Binmore and Paul
Klemperer 2002). There are many other
examples, from designing multiunit auc-
tions (Jeffrey S. Banks, John O. Ledyard,
and David P. Porter 1989) to designing pro-
cedures to allocate access to railroad tracks
(Paul J. Brewer and Plott 1996), payload
priority on the space shuttle (Ledyard,
Porter and Randii Wessen 2002), and air-
port take-off and landing slots (Stephen J.
Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, and Robert L.
Bulfin 1982).
Second, and of more relevance for our dis-
cussion, much of the work in experimental
economics has centered around identifying
inaccuracies and imprecisions in economic
theory.20 For example, the standard eco-
nomic model of individual behavior is that
people maximize expected utility. However,
ample experimental evidence suggests that
people do not always maximize expected
utility, and do not count upon others to do
so.21 More generally, there are long-standing
22 See, for example, Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein,
and Drazen Prelec (2003), Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky (2000), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Richard
H. Thaler (1992, 1994), and Tversky and Kahneman
(1982).
23 Neglecting this last point makes it all too easy to fall
into a state of tension in which the primary value of exper-
iments is seen as debunking theory, and theory is viewed as
having to defend itself from the challenge of experiments.
Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that economic
experiments owe much of their prominence to their
demonstration that economic theory can be surprisingly
robust. For example, Vernon Smith’s work on actions (see
Theodore Bergstrom [2003] for a survey and Smith [1991,
2000] for collections of papers) showed that elementary
supply-and-demand models, the bread-and-butter tool of
much of economics, were surprisingly descriptive.
24 Binmore (1999) advocates such a “consolidating”
view of the interaction between theory and experiments.
research programs in economics and psy-
chology that serve as a conscience for eco-
nomic theory, arguing that much of our
theory does not provide a good match for
behavior.22
The difficulty here is that theories are
intended to be inaccurate and imprecise. As
we have noted, a theory is a deliberate
approximation of a world too complicated to
be analyzed in complete detail. It is then no
surprise to find that the theory does not
always match behavior. Experimental con-
firmation of this fact is potentially helpful,
but only if it also points the way toward an
improved theory.23 The constructive role for
experiments that challenge economic theo-
ries is thus not to simply argue that existing
theories do not work, but to point the way to
improvements.24 Perhaps paradoxically, it is
when playing this role that experiments
pose the greatest challenge to economic
theorists. It is relatively easy to dismiss an
experimental contention that a theory is
sometimes off the mark, but much harder to
ignore an indication of how it might be
improved.
A new difficulty now appears. When
assessing potentially improved theories, we
must trade off competing features that
leave us with only a partial order over alter-
natives. Theories are better if they are
more accurate and precise, but also if they
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25 Standard models of reasoning and knowledge begin
with a set of states and a partition over these states repre-
senting the structure of the available information (e.g.,
Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, and
Moshe Y. Vardi 1995). These models have the implication
that one automatically knows every implication of any
information received. Hence, knowledge of the rules of
chess ensures that one knows an optimal strategy, while
knowledge of the basic axioms of mathematics makes all of
the theorems of mathematics instantly available. It is no
surprise that such models do not encourage one to think
about the costs of complicated reasoning.
26 Barton L. Lipman (1999) examines a formal model of
the cost of using a theory.
are more parsimonious (i.e., have smaller
N, for fixed M, or in some cases that have
smaller N and M). A theory that makes bet-
ter predictions at the cost of more com-
plexity is not necessarily more desirable.
Nor is the goal necessarily a single “cor-
rect” theory. Instead, we can expect to work
with a portfolio of theories that address dif-
ferent issues and that lie at different points
along a frontier that trades off power and
complication.
The idea that a more complicated theory
may not be better is obscured by economic
theory itself, which implicitly assumes that
reasoning and inference is costless and auto-
matic.25 In practice, however, it is a familiar
idea that theories are costly to use, and
hence that a more accurate or more precise
theory is not always superior.26 This point is
often illustrated in introductory economics
classes by asking students to think of a road
map as a metaphor for an economic theory,
and then to note that a map on a scale of 1:1
would be more precise than is commonly
found, but its very detail would render it
useless.
One of the obstacles to the integration of
economic theory and experiments is thus
that we have no clear idea of what makes a
theory good. For example, we have ample
evidence of shortcomings of expected utili-
ty theory, as well as an ample collection of
alternative models. However, while it is
easy to find papers in theory journals work-
ing on the tools that might serve as alterna-
tives to expected utility theory, it is much
harder to find papers that use these tools.
Why? The informal explanation typically is
that for most applications, expected utility
theory’s lack of realism is a reasonable price
to pay for its simplicity. This assessment
convinces some, while striking others as too
easy an excuse.
David W. Harless and Colin F. Camerer
(1994) provide a foundation for examining
this issue, introducing the notion of an effi-
ciency frontier for generalizations of
expected utility theory, balancing predictive
power and simplicity. They find that ordi-
nary expected utility theory lies on this fron-
tier, as do several more sophisticated
theories. This at least provides some reas-
surance that expected utility theory is not
dominated on every dimension. Depending
upon our requirements, we might reason-
ably choose to work at various points on this
frontier, including work with expected utili-
ty. But what is the criterion by which points
along this frontier are evaluated, other than
conventional wisdom and accepted prac-
tice? How much of conventional wisdom
and accepted practice reflects inertia, his-
torical accident, a lack of familiarity with
new theories, fashion, and similar factors? If
we are to insist that the goal of a theory is
not to be right but to be useful, then one of
the great difficulties with economic theory
is that we have little consensus on what
makes a theory useful, other than that it is
customarily used.
This presents a challenge in two respects.
Theorists need to be more explicit, both in
their theory and in their reactions to experi-
ments, as to how they assess the trade-offs
between various limitations. Experimentalists,
when interpreting results as supporting an
elaboration of existing theory, must address
not only the potentially increased precision
and accuracy of the theory but also the
increased complication.
Is there anything special about experi-
ments in this discussion? In one sense, no.
The ideas apply to the use of data in gener-
al, regardless of whether an experiment lies
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27 The line between experimental and field data is
becoming increasingly blurred, as economists turn to
“field experiments” designed to capture the best of both
settings. See Harrison and John A. List (2004) for an intro-
duction to field experiments and the methodological issues
they raise.
28 If we cannot observe situations consistent with input
x
N in the field, why do we care about x
N? The answer is that
some values of x
N may provide especially revealing condi-
tions under which to evaluate the theory. For example,
theories about bargaining may be more readily evaluated
when complicating interpersonal factors are stripped away
by examining anonymous bargaining. This in turn my be
possible only in the laboratory. For similar reasons, scien-
tists may endeavor to free their experimental environ-
ments of impurities, even though such an environment is
not observed in nature.
at their source.27 However, the great attrac-
tion and relevance of experiments is the
ability they provide to control inputs. If we
are interested in assessing the output f(x
N)
produced by the theory f in response to
input  x
N, it may be easier to create (or
approximate) input x
N in the laboratory than
“in the field.”28 The value of this control
becomes all the more apparent upon realiz-
ing that we typically can neither ensure that
our inputs include all of the factors we
would like to have, nor that they exclude all
of the ones we would like to not have. At the
same time, this advantage brings with it a
new challenge. How do we know when the
experimental setting has done its job, giving
us observations from situations consistent
with the desired input x
N and not something
else? We return to this issue in section 5.1.
3.3 Why Theory
What does economic theory have to con-
tribute? Paralleling the preceding discus-
sion, it is helpful to begin with the
limitations of experimental work:
• Experiments may be inaccurate: the
experimental procedure is itself a situa-
tion. This procedure has presumably
been designed to control the key fea-
tures of the situation, but we cannot
expect to have controlled everything.
How do we know that the design brings
the experimental situation sufficiently
close to the real-world situations in
29 In one view of economic theory, there would be no
problem of external validity. Elon Kohlberg and Jean
François Mertens (1986, p. 1005) state: “We adhere to
the classical point of view that the game under consider-
ation fully describes the real situation—that any
(pre)commitment possibilities, any repetitive aspect, any
probabilities of error, or any possibility of jointly observ-
ing some random event, have already been modeled in
the game tree.” Pushing this view as far as it will go, the
theory then identifies the situation exactly. If the theory
is simple enough that all of its aspects can be captured in
the lab, then we literally have the situation of interest and
not simply an approximation, leaving no room for ques-
tions of external validity. If not, then the laboratory inves-
tigation is irrelevant to the theory. Under this view, an
experimental result at odds with the theory tells us only
that the experimental design has not captured the condi-
tions under which the theory applies. This classical
approach is best viewed as a philosophical exploration of
the idea of rationality. It contrasts with a positive
approach, under which economic theory is viewed as a
tool for modeling and understanding behavior, a tool that
is more useful the broader is its applicability. In this case,
experimental results at odds with the theory help identify
circumstances under which the theory is not applicable.
30 For example, do the choices of experimental subjects
reveal the values they place on the consequences of those
choices or some other aspect of the process by which
choices are made or values identified? See Harrison,
Ronald M. Harstad, and Elisabet Rutström (2002) for a
discussion of value elicitation.
which we are interested to be informa-
tive about the latter? Experimental psy-
chology refers to this as the question of
external validity.29
• Experiments may be imprecise: our inter-
pretation of an experiment may incor-
rectly identify the links between the
situation and the results. The unrecog-
nized links may make the resulting infer-
ences too noisy to be useful. This is a
question of internal validity.30
•  Experiments may be uninformative. It
may not be possible to bring the experi-
mental design x
N close enough to the
situation to provide useful information.
• Experiments may be informative only at
prohibitive cost. Though one of the obvi-
ous advantages of experiments is the
ability to address otherwise intractable
problems in a manageable way, there
may be cases where this is not feasible.
Again, these are neither sharply defined
nor mutually exclusive categories, and we
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31 Developing such a theory is itself quite costly, so
much so that its provision to other countries is treason-
ous. But in this case, the relevant experiments involve
nuclear detonations whose direct and political costs are
even larger.
can expect experiments to exhibit elements
of each.
How can economic theory help? First,
economic theory can fill the gap when exper-
iments are not sufficiently informative (at a
reasonable cost) to be useful. Oil companies
maintain teams of geologists who supple-
ment sampling data with theoretical models
designed to predict the likelihood of finding
oil beneath a tract of land or ocean bed. Why
bother, when a single experimental observa-
tion would suffice to provide the result? The
difficulty is that the experiment in question
consists of drilling a well, which can be suffi-
ciently expensive as to be undertaken only
after a favorable theoretical assessment.
Similarly, our primary means of assessing
nuclear weapons is theoretical, in the form
of computer simulations.31 The relevant
experiments are too costly.
Second, and again of more relevance for
the current discussion, economic theory can
be useful in assessing the external and inter-
nal validity of experiments. Insight into links
between experimental outcomes and uncon-
trolled aspects of the experimental situation
(and hence external validity), or insight into
the link between the experimental environ-
ment and the observed behavior (internal
validity), can be provided by theoretical
models of the behavior. For example, exper-
imental outcomes in continuous double auc-
tion markets (e.g., Plott and Smith 1978;
Smith 1962, 1964, 1965, 1976, 1982) have
been surprisingly efficient, given the appar-
ent thinness of the markets. How do the
traders overcome the frictions of a thin mar-
ket to achieve nearly efficient outcomes?
Under what circumstances can we expect
similar behavior in actual markets and when
should we be less sanguine about efficiency?
Addressing the latter question has become
easier as theoretical models have tackled the
32 Difficulties in distinguishing between theories that
are consistent with observations and theories that “explain”
these observations are not special to economics. Similar
considerations arise in the view that one can falsify, but
cannot “prove,” a scientific theory.
33 One response to concerns over internal and external
validity is to subject the relevant experimental protocol to
scrutiny. For example, Thaler (1988) wonders whether
Binmore, Shaked, and John Sutton (1985) might have
influenced the behavior of their experimental subjects by
stressing in their experimental instructions that subjects
should maximize their monetary payoffs. As in other
experimental sciences, however, a useful response to
potential inaccuracy or imprecision in economic experi-
ments is to rely on replication. The more readily an exper-
imental result can be replicated, the less likely is it to
hinge upon uncontrolled or unrecognized features of a sit-
uation. The evaluation of a new experimental situation
then lies in the ability of its “control” treatment to repli-
cate previous results. For two examples among many,
Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton begin their experiment by
replicating the results of Werner Güth, Rolf
Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982), and Charles
R. Plott and Zeiler (2003) begin their investigation of the
endowment effect by replicating previous findings.
former, showing that the continuous flow of
offers, coupled with traders’ budget con-
straints, generates a mechanical but power-
ful push in the direction of efficient
outcomes (Brewer, Maria Huang, Brad
Nelson, and Plott 2002; Dhananjay K. Gode
and Shyam Sunder 1993, 1993, 1997;
Sunder 2004). Alternatively, inconsistent
behavior in laboratory decision problems is
often interpreted as reflecting preferences
that violate the expected-utility axioms. How
do we know when we have uncovered some-
thing about preferences and when we should
seek some other explanation in the experi-
mental design? We have more confidence in
the links between behavior and preferences
when we have models of the latter.
Once again, a difficulty arises. A model
consistent with the observed behavior does
not always identify the principles behind the
behavior. Instead, experience has shown that
economists can build a variety of models
consistent with virtually any behavior.32 How
do we know when we have hit upon a clever
but irrelevant model and when our model
captures something important?33
Revisiting a theme, one of the obstacles to
the integration of economic theory and
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34 Among many such examples, Timothy N. Cason and
Daniel Friedman (1996) and John H. Kagel, Harstad, and
Dan Levin (1987) begin their analysis with theoretical
models, focusing on aspects of behavior the models cannot
accommodate.
experiments is thus that we have no clear
idea of when we have a good match between
theory and behavior. This difficulty again
poses a challenge in two respects. For theo-
rists, there is much to be done in terms of
identifying behavior that would enhance
one’s confidence that the theory in question
has captured the relevant principles, or that
would force one to question such a conclu-
sion. A good start would be to consistently
explain what behavior a theory cannot
explain.34 For experimentalists, it can be
important to argue not only that a model
captures the outcomes of the experiment,
but that it captures the appropriate links
between the experimental situation and the
outcome. Again, a good start would be to
consistently explain what outcomes would
lead to the opposite conclusion.
4. Combining Theory and Experiments
4.1 Using Experiments to Learn About
Theory
4.1.1 Testing Theory: Accuracy
How can we use experiments to evaluate
economic theory? Suppose we fix an experi-
mental design x
N and a set of possible out-
puts S
M, identifying the features of the input
and output that are considered salient in the
experiment. The resulting experiment pro-
duces an output s
M. Does this indicate that
we should be more confident of economic
theories that place relatively large probabili-
ty on the outcome s
M, or on similar out-
comes, when faced with the input x
N? Some
useful insight into this question is given by
the following argument, adapted from
Alvaro Sandroni (2002), that is typical of the
calibration literature.
Given the design x
N, the experiment’s out-
put s
M is randomly determined by the envi-
ronment. In particular, a situation x∞ is
35 Formally,  π*(s
M) is proportional (being rescaled to
ensure a total probability of one) to ρ({x∞ ∈ X∞ : x∞(n)  
x
N(n), n   1,…, N and F
M(x∞)   s
M}).
36 Recall that a theory is an element of   S
M, being a
distribution from which a distribution over s
M is randomly
drawn. Notice that the outcomes of the experiment and
the theory are drawn from different spaces. This is famil-
iar. For example, the experiment produces the outcome
rain or no rain, according to a distribution that depends
upon such factors as the location and the season. The the-
ory is allowed to announce a probability of rain, which
may itself be drawn from a distribution that depends upon
similar factors.
randomly drawn from the set of situations
whose first N dimensions match x
N, i.e., from
the set of situations that match the experi-
mental design in those features controlled by
the design. This situation is then converted
into an output according to the function F
describing the environment, and we observe
the first M dimensions of this output, giving
the output s
M. We let π
∗ denote the resulting
probability distribution over the set of possi-
ble experimental outputs S
M, and refer to π
∗
as the true distribution.35
Similarly, given the input x
N, a theory f can
be viewed as producing an output π∈  S
M,
i.e., a probability distribution over the set of
possible outcomes . This output is itself ran-
domly chosen according to a probability dis-
tribution over  S
M that is determined by the
theory.36 We let f
∗ denote this distribution.
The task now is to describe the implica-
tions of the experiment for the theory. We
think of running the experiment, producing
a randomly-drawn output s
M (from the dis-
tribution π
∗ induced by the experiment), and
choosing a randomly-drawn distribution π
(from the distribution f
∗ induced by the the-
ory). We insert these realizations into an
evaluation rule T(s
M,π). The evaluation rule
produces the output T(s
M,π) 1 if we accept
the theory given realizations π and s
M and
T(s
M,π) 0 if we reject the theory given real-
izations π and s
M. Clearly, of course, a single
experiment does not suffice to evaluate a
theory. The labels “accept” and “reject”
might accordingly be more precisely (but
also more cumbersomely) phrased as
“regard this experiment as evidence in favor
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37 For example, we can design an evaluation rule that
can observe one hundred flips of a coin and simultaneous-
ly be quite likely to conclude that the coin is biased
towards heads when it is, and quite likely to conclude that
the coin is biased toward tails when it is, because these two
biases (if true) generate quite different distributions over
experimental outcomes.
of the theory” and “regard this experiment as
evidence questioning the theory.”
How do we design a useful evaluation rule
T? One desirable criterion is that if one were
to offer the true distribution π
∗ as the real-
ized output of one’s theory, then our evalua-
tion of the experimental evidence should be
unlikely to reject it. Because the experimen-
tal outcome is random, we cannot expect the
distribution π
∗ to always prompt an accept-
ance. For example, the evidence will some-
times reject the theory that a fair coin yields
heads on half of its flips, simply because we
encounter an unusual and unlikely sequence
of outcomes. However, we can reasonably
ask that such rejections be rare. We make
this idea precise by saying that an evaluation
rule  accepts the truth with probability at
least 1   if, for any true distribution π
∗,
.
Hence, with probability at least 1  , the
true distribution π
∗ generates an experimen-
tal outcome s
M that would not prompt us to
reject the truth, if we were asked to evaluate
the truth as a possible theory. Notice that we
will typically not know the true distribution
π
∗ when designing an evaluation rule, and
hence our requirement is that the evaluation
rule be unlikely to reject the truth (given the
distribution of experimental outcomes gen-
erated by the truth), regardless of what the
truth happens to be.37
At the other end of the spectrum, an eval-
uation rule is not particularly helpful in
assessing a theory if there are no experimen-
tal outcomes that would cause the theory to
be rejected (even though this would be one
way to accept the truth with high probabili-
ty). For example, an experimental test of the
theory that a coin is fair is not helpful if it
   
∗∗ () = {} () ≥− sT s
MM :,11
38 This is a special case of Proposition 1 in Alvaro
Sandroni (2002).
always accepts the theory, but could be use-
ful if it instead rejects the theory if the
observed proportion of heads (or tails) is too
large. To capture this distinction, we say that
an evaluation rule is blindly passed by theory




Hence, no matter what observation s
M the
experiment produces, with probability at
least 1   the theory f (via its induced distri-
bution f
∗) produces a distribution π over pos-
sible experimental outcomes that causes the
theory to be accepted (given the observation
s
M). The phrase “blindly passed” here refers
to the fact that the theory f is accepted by
the evaluation rule with probability at least
1   regardless of the experimental outcome
or, equivalently, to the fact that f embodies
no understanding of the true process gener-
ating experimental outcomes. As a result, a
theory may blindly pass an evaluation rule
with high probability, but without providing
any insight into the principles governing the
outcome in this situation.
The main result (proven in section 7) is
now:38
Proposition 1 Any evaluation rule that
accepts the truth with probability 1   can
be blindly passed with probability 1  .
At first glance, it seems obvious that an
evaluation rule that accepts the truth can be
passed—one need only propose the truth as
one’s theory. However, Proposition 1 makes
a quite different assertion. If an evaluation
rule accepts the truth sufficiently often
(i.e., with probability 1  ), then one can
find a theory that requires no knowledge of
the truth and has the property that, no mat-
ter what the outcome of the experiment
and no matter what the actual process gen-
erating the experimental outcomes, the the-
ory is accepted with probability 1  . The
following illustrates:
fT s
M ∗ () = {} () ≥−      :, 11
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39 If the true distribution is π∗  , the evaluation rule
accepts  π∗ if the experiment generates outcome tail,
which happens with probability 1 π∗(  ). If the true dis-
tribution is π∗  , the evaluation rule accepts π∗ if the
experiment generates outcome head, which happens with
probability π∗(  ).
40 It is to be expected that an experiment with only two
outcomes provides rather crude information—how much
information can one expect to extract about the probabili-
ty of heads, from a coin of unknown bias, from a single
flip? Higher minimum acceptance probabilities require
richer outcome spaces. Whether we are better off in this
case with a rule that accepts the truth with probability 
depends upon the relative costs of mistakenly accepting or











Example. Suppose that there are only two
possible outcomes of an experiment, head
and tail. The environment induces a true
probability distribution over these two out-
comes, which we denote as π
∗∈[0,1], where
π
∗ is the probability of the experimental out-
come head.A sthe notation suggests, we can
think of the experiment as a single flip of a
(possibly biased) coin, with π
∗ being the true
probability of a head. The theory generates a
(possibly randomly determined) candidate
probability π, which we must then combine
with the experimental outcome to evaluate
the theory. A possible evaluation rule is:
.
Hence, the theory is accepted if the experi-
mental realization is tail and the realization
π of the theory attaches probability less than
to head (the first line), and is accepted if
the experimental realization is head and the
realization of the theory attaches probabili-
ty at least to head (the second line). This
particular evaluation rule accepts the truth
with probability at least .39 Such a mini-
mum acceptance probability does not sound
very impressive. By altering the evaluation
rule, we could manage to boost this proba-
bility to , but could not go further in this
case.40 Now suppose the theory f draws π
uniformly from the set [0,1]. Hence, consis-
tent with the model of Section 3.1, the


































41 Here, it is clear that one is not simply predicting well
by offering the truth as a prediction, since the prediction is
chosen first and then a worst-case specification of the truth
is chosen.
the outcome head is itself drawn randomly
according to a distribution f
∗ over ∆S
M.
Given the uniform distribution we clearly
work without any information as to what the
truth might be. Then
.
,
and hence the evaluation rule is blindly
passed with probability  .
To see the intuition behind Proposition 1,
think of playing a zero-sum game against a
malevolent and possibly omniscient oppo-
nent, “Nature,” where Nature chooses the
true theory π
∗ generating the experimental
outcomes and you choose a theory f, with
Nature attempting to maximize the probabil-
ity of an outcome that rejects your theory
(here we see Nature’s malevolence) and you
trying to minimize this probability. Suppose
(counterfactually) that you had the luxury of
observing Nature’s choice before making
your own. Then you could always simply
name Nature’s choice as your theory, and the
requirement that the test accept the truth
with probability 1   ensures that your suc-
cess probability would be at least 1  .
Alternatively, the worst that could happen is
that Nature gets to observe your proposed
theory before choosing the truth (here we
see Nature’s potential omniscience) and then
chooses the truth to minimize your success
rate.41 The minmax theorem then gives us a
result that is familiar in the context of zero-
sum games, namely that you can do as well in
the second circumstance as in the first, and
hence can succeed with probability at least
1   in the second circumstance. But your
optimal performance in the actual game, in
which neither side gets to observe the other’s
move, must be somewhere between these
best and worst cases, ensuring that the test
can be blindly passed with probability 1  .
1
3
fT h e a d f




fT t a i l f
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42 Eddie Dekel and Yossi Feinberg (2004) propose a
test for whether one’s theory matches the environmental
function F that hinges upon asking one to design (rather
than react to) an evaluation rule T.
The implication of this result is that the
ability of an economic theory to match exper-
imental data does not necessarily provide
evidence in support of the theory. Instead,
given any specification of questions that a
theory could be asked, and any specification
of how the answers to these questions are to
be compared to the experimental evidence,
one can devise a theory based on no under-
standing of the situation or the underlying
principles that allows one to be as successful
as knowing those principles precisely.
This result is not simply a restatement of
the common view that it is somehow more
instructive if one first commits to a theory
and then compares it to data (rather than
first observing the data and then constructing
a theoretical rationalization). More impor-
tantly, this result is not simply a restatement
of the observation that it is important for the-
ories constructed in response to experimen-
tal observations to make “out of sample”
predictions, i.e., predictions that could be
assessed only with the collection of new data.
Instead, the ability to blindly construct a
theory  f that fares as well as the truth
depends upon knowing the evaluation rule T
by which the theory is to be assessed. As
long as we identify a fixed set of potential
tests to which a theory is to be subjected,
whether in or out of sample, we can blindly
construct a theory that fares as well as the
truth in these tests, regardless of whether we
have seen the outcomes of the tests and
regardless of what these outcomes might be.
Interpreting experimental evidence as sup-
porting a theory, or offering a theory as an
interpretation of experimental evidence,
thus acquires some bite only if the theory is
clear and complete enough that it can be
extended to answer new questions and con-
front new tests that did not play a role in the
construction of the theory.42 Is the theory
43 This ability to mix is important, as without it one can-
not be assured of blindly passing evaluation rules that
accept the truth.
clear enough that others could design new
tests, and is one willing to risk the theory in
such tests? If not, then it is not clear that
progress has been made.
For example, Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) offer
models motivated by behavior in bargain-
ing experiments, with each model consist-
ing of an explicit specification of how utility
depends upon (one’s own and one’s rival’s)
payoffs (cf. section 2). In doing so, the
authors are offering models that (like all
others) cannot hope to capture every detail
of human motivation, and hence are bound
to fail some tests. However, these models
exhibit the essential characteristic of being
sufficiently precise and powerful that new
tests can be devised. The authors are taking
some risk in presenting their theories so
explicitly, but in return they ensure that
their models can be meaningfully investi-
gated experimentally. If their models do
not provide useful alternatives to the
hypothesis that players maximize their
expected monetary payoffs, they will be
stepping stones to such alternatives. Either
way, their models allow progress that would
be impossible without the ability to venture
beyond the experimental designs that
prompted them.
4.1.2 The Margin of Error: Precision
We have modeled a theory as producing
a probability distribution over probability
distributions over outcomes.43 In most
cases, an economic theory provides nothing
of the sort, with deterministic outcomes
being the rule. How do we put these two
together?
Think first about how economists typi-
cally do empirical work. The underlying
intuition and theoretical structure come
from a model free of anything random. But
before confronting this model with the
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44 For surveys, see Douglas D. Davis and Charles A.
Holt (1993), Kagel (1995), and Kagel and Levin (2002).
45 Such trembles may initially appear difficult to moti-
vate, but similar ideas have played an important role in the
equilibrium refinements literature. More importantly, the
possibility that typing or other errors might lead to mistak-
en bids was a serious concern in the design of the FCC
spectrum auctions (Paul Milgrom 2004).
data generated by a noisy world, an error
term is added. The characteristics of this
error can be important, providing the foun-
dations for the inferences to be drawn from
the results.
Assumptions about errors play a similarly
important role in interpreting experimental
results. One argues not that the data and the
theory are a perfect match, but rather that
the errors required to reconcile the data
with the model are not too large.
What does “not too large” mean? Auctions
have received significant attention from
experimentalists, with results that often
appear to be at odds with theoretical predic-
tions.44 One interpretation of the observed
behavior is to assume that subjects invari-
ably intend to identify and take their optimal
actions, but that some sort of “tremble”
translates this optimal action into a random
choice.45 The evidence convinces most
observers that by this standard, there is
often a large gap between theoretical results
and experimental behavior: the trembles
required to reconcile the two are too large,
and hence much of auction theory appears
insufficiently accurate to be a useful
description of behavior.
Alternatively, one might interpret the
observed behavior by assuming that subjects
are only  -optimizers, being content with
identifying and playing an action that is
within some   of a best response. Section 2
touched on Harrison’s (1989, 1992) argu-
ment that, by this standard, very little error
is required to reconcile the theory with the
data. It turns out that one’s actions have rel-
atively little effect on expected payoffs in
many auctions (as long as actions are not too
far from equilibrium), and hence that one
46 At the same time, the experimental results still pres-
ent a challenge for the theory. We no longer have evidence
that the model is inaccurate, but we have evidence that it
is not sufficiently precise to be a useful description of
behavior. In response, we could restrict our attention to
payoffs (effectively, shortening the list M of outputs of the
theory) or refine the theory in hopes of more precisely cap-
turing behavior.
47 Binmore and Samuelson (1999) study learning mod-
els whose results depend importantly on the nature of
(possibly very small) errors.
48 It is a familiar result that incorporating uncertainty
into the construction of a model can yield results that dif-
fer from simply appending error terms to a deterministic
model. For example, incorporating an error term into play-
ers’ choices in a game and then solving for a (perfect) equi-
librium (Reinhard Selten 1975) can give results quite
different than first solving for a (Nash) equilibrium and
then adding an error term.
can come close to maximizing one’s expect-
ed payoff with actions that seem far away
from the equilibrium. If we are to view
errors in this way, then we must be careful
in concluding either that optimization is a
poor description of individual behavior or
that the outcome is not (approximately) in
equilibrium.46
Yet another interpretation of the observed
behavior assumes that subjects choose their
actions not by optimizing but through a
process of trial-and-error learning.47 Here,
errors are measured in terms of the strength
of the incentives embedded in the learning
process.
The implication in each case is that the
interpretation of experimental results
requires not only a theory, but also some
idea of what types of errors are most likely
involved when the theory does not work per-
fectly. Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R.
Palfrey’s (1995) quantal response equilibri-
um is perhaps the best developed and most
general such model, built around agents who
maximize utility functions perturbed by ran-
dom terms. Notice that the errors here are
built into the model of individual behavior
from the beginning rather than being added
at the end.48 These errors can be interpret-
ed as capturing unmodeled but (one hopes)
small effects on preferences. Quantal
response equilibria have been used to good
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49 See, for example, Simon P. Anderson, Jacob K.
Goeree, and Charles A. Holt (1998, 1998, 2001), Georee
and Holt (2001), Goeree, Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey
(2002), and Richard D. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992,
1995, 1998).
50 Though the technical details are different, this result
is similar in spirit to John O. Ledyard’s (1986) observation
that any behavior is consistent with the notion of Bayesian
equilibrium.
51 A concentration on comparative statics requires
that the distributions of the error distributions do not
vary (or vary sufficiently regularly) as the parameters of
the problem vary, a requirement lying behind many an
econometric inquiry.
effect in analyzing a variety of experimental
results.49
Once again, however, new challenges
appear. Philip Haile, Ali Hortacsu, and
Grigory Kosenok (2004) show that quantal
response equilibrium is a sufficiently flexible
notion that, by appropriately specifying the
error terms, one can obtain equilibria con-
sistent with any behavior that one might
possibly observe. The unmodeled errors are
thus important. Without further assump-
tions concerning their distribution, too much
is left out of the model for its predictions to
be usefully precise.50
There are then two possibilities for har-
nessing the potential power of quantal
response equilibria. First, quantal response
models can provide comparative static
implications even without distributional
assumptions.51 Alternatively, Haile,
Hortacsu, and Kosenok’s (2004) result
depends upon having sufficient freedom in
specifying the errors in the individual utili-
ties underlying the quantal response model.
We may often have either intuition or exper-
imental evidence about what forces are cap-
tured by the errors. We may then augment
the underlying model with hypotheses about
the distribution of errors sufficiently power-
ful to produce precise results. In effect, we
are enhancing precision by expanding the
set of inputs X
N to capture more informa-
tion. Jacob K. Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey
(2004) note that applications of quantal
response equilibria typically work with mod-
els that are monotonic, in the sense that
52 For example, a logit choice model with independent,
identically distributed extreme-value errors satisfies
monotonicity.
53 Other examples of work focussing on the structure of
errors include Mahmoud A. El-Gamal and David M.
Grether (1995), David W. Harless and Camerer (1995),
Harrison (1990), and Daniel Houser, Michael Keane, and
McCabe (1995). Similarly, Ledyard’s (1986) analysis of
Bayesian equilibrium suggests that we augment the model,
perhaps with assumptions about players’ beliefs.
54 For work on subject heterogeneity, see Andreoni,
Marco Castillo, and Ragan Petrie (2003), Andreoni and
John Miller (2002), and the examples cited in note 53.
increasing the expected payoff of an alterna-
tive increases the probability that it is cho-
sen.52 Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey provide
sufficient conditions for quantal response
equilibria to be monotonic and show that
monotonic quantal response equilibria can
have substantive empirical content.53 The
informativeness of experiments based on
quantal response models is thus enhanced
by a better theoretical understanding of
such models.
Focusing attention on the specification of
errors has the advantage of leading naturally
to a provision for heterogeneity in players’
behavior. Perhaps one of the most robust
findings to emerge from experimental eco-
nomics is that such heterogeneity is wide-
spread and substantial. Despite this,
heterogeneity has often not played a promi-
nent role in many theoretical models.
Instead, theoretical explanations often have
the flavor of seeking “the” model of individ-
ual behavior that will account for the experi-
mental behavior. This appears to be a
holdover from the original presumption that
monetary payoffs, common to all subjects,
suitably captured preferences, an assump-
tion that encourages a view of players as
homogeneous.54 Error terms provide a natu-
ral vehicle for capturing heterogeneity.
The implication is that there is much to be
gained by making our treatment of errors in
individual decision-making more explicit,
and hence much to be gained in the inter-
pretation of experimental results by being
more careful with our theory. However, this
is a task made all the more daunting by the
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55 See Shane Frederick, Loewenstein, and Ted
O’Donoghue (2002) for a survey and Maribeth Coller,
Harrison, and Rutström (2003) for an alternative view.
observation that the considerations relegat-
ed to error terms are often there because we
know little about them. Once again, theorists
are sent back to the drawing board in search
of theories precise enough to be useful.
4.2 Using Theory to Learn about
Experiments
4.2.1 External Validity
Having found an experimental regularity,
how do we assess whether the experimental
design from which it emerges is a good
match for the intended application (the
question of eternal validity) and whether we
have linked the resulting behavior to the
appropriate characteristics of the design?
The obvious observation is that more exper-
iments are always helpful, and one of the
great advantages of the experimental
method is the ability to collect more data.
But economic theory has a role to play in
conjunction with these experiments.
For example, the standard assumption
when modeling intertemporal choice is that
people maximize the sum of exponentially-
discounted expected utilities. Expected util-
ity theory derives much of its appeal from
the fact that it rests upon a collection of
axioms that can be interpreted as prescribing
consistent behavior (Leonard J. Savage
1972). Extending this argument to intertem-
poral behavior, consistency is similarly
ensured by exponential discounting.
The difficulty is that the experimental evi-
dence has not been particularly supportive
of exponential discounting.55 The consensus
leans toward a model in which discounting
departs from exponential in the direction of
being biased toward the present, so that dis-
count rates decline as one evaluates more
distant payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting is
the most prominent example.
The case for hyperbolic discounting (or
other forms involving a bias toward the
56 The function V is implicitly defined by t ∈arg maxt
{c(t) V(  t)}.
present) is often bolstered with results from
(nonhuman) animal as well as human exper-
iments. The use of hyperbolic discounting
in interpreting results from animal experi-
ments is routine (e.g., James E. Mazur 1984,
1986, 1987). The question to be considered
here is one of external validity: how relevant
is the animal evidence for human behavior?
Our approach to this question is not to
debate how similar are animals and humans,
but rather how similar are the typical dis-
counting problems faced by animals and
humans. In turn, the approach to this latter
question is to examine theoretical models of
these discounting problems.
Discounting in animals is commonly
examined in the context of foraging behavior
(e.g., Alasdair I. Houston and John M.
McNamara (1999), Alex Kacelnik (1997),
Michael Bulmer (1997)). It is helpful to
begin with a highly simplified, deterministic
model. Suppose an animal faces the prob-
lem of maximizing total food consumption
over an interval of length T. A function
c:IR +→IR + identifies the quantity of con-
sumption c(t) that can be secured upon the
investment of foraging time t. The animal is
to make a succession of foraging-time/con-
sumption pairs of the form (t,c(t)), where
each choice (t,c(t)) allows consumption c(t)
but precludes another choice until time t
has passed.
The animal’s task is to choose an optimal
pair (tr,c(tr)) for any length   of time remain-
ing in the foraging interval. Let V( ) be the
value of the optimal continuation consump-
tion plan, given the length   of time remain-
ing.56 If    is sufficiently large, then the
optimal consumption plan will be nearly sta-
tionary, featuring a choice of some fixed,





   () = ()
∗
∗
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But then the optimal consumption plan t∗
maximizes
(1)
Hence, optimal foraging behavior induces a
preference for consumption c(t) at time t
over c(t ) at t  if
.
Consumption at time t is thus optimally dis-
counted by 1/t, i.e., is discounted by the
hyperbolic function 1/t. It then seems unsur-
prising that experiments with animals are
suggestive of hyperbolic discounting.
How relevant is this evidence for humans?
Hyperbolic discounting arises out of a model
in which delayed consumption imposes an
opportunity cost, in the sense that other con-
sumption opportunities are precluded while
waiting for the current realization. The vari-
able t measures the time spent foraging, dur-
ing which consumption is precluded. There
is nothing like this in the intertemporal deci-
sion problems typically associated with
hyperbolic discounting in humans, where t
measures a delay during which other options
are not closed. For example, when facing the
canonical hyperbolic-discounting story of
choosing between one sum of money now
and another in a week, and then between
the same sums in fifty-two and fifty-three
weeks, there is no presumption that inter-
vening consumption possibilities are sacri-
ficed. We thus have reason to doubt that
hyperbolic discounting in animals has suffi-
cient external validity to be of relevance for
human behavior.
This observation is only the first step of
the story. There may still be good reasons for
humans to engage in hyperbolic discounting.
One possibility is that human intertemporal
preferences were formed during a time in
which people typically faced decision prob-
lems similar to the foraging choices thought
to be typical of animal decisions, and that
people now simply apply the resulting











57 Peter D. Sozou (1998) and Partha Dasgupta and Eric
Maskin (2003) explore evolutionary motivations for hyper-
bolic discounting that do not depend upon foraging as the
standard decision problem.
58 This possibility provides one illustration of how elu-
sive external validity can be. There is often no single or
obvious external situation to which the model is to be
applied. The question may then not be whether there are
situations outside the laboratory that correspond to the
experiment, but rather whether the corresponding situa-
tions are the “right” ones.  We return to this point at the
end of this section.
current decisions without noting the differ-
ent context.57 In effect, the opportunity
costs of the time sacrificed while waiting for
consumption may have been important in
the ordinary lives of our ancestors, even if
we do not commonly encounter it in our
lives, potentially restoring the relevance of
the animal experiments.58
A second difficulty now arises. Suppose we
expand our simple foraging model to accom-
modate uncertainty. Let {X(1),…, X(n)} be a
collection of independent, positive-valued
random variables. We interpret each of these
as representing a foraging strategy, with each
foraging strategy characterized by a random
length of time until it yields a consumption
opportunity. To keep the example transpar-
ent, we simplify our previous model by
assuming that each consumption opportunity
features one unit of food. The animal chooses
a foraging strategy, waits until its payoff is real-
ized, chooses another strategy (perhaps the
same one), and so on, until a fixed foraging
period of length T has been exhausted.
This model gives what is commonly known
as a renewal process. The intuition is that
once a unit of food has been received, the
process has been “renewed,” in the sense that
the set of possible choices and outcomes has
reverted (literally in the case of an infinite
horizon and approximately in the case of a
sufficiently long finite horizon) to its original
configuration. For sufficiently long horizons,
the optimal strategy will again be approxi-
mately stationary. Consider a stationary strat-
egy, in which the same random variable X(i)
is chosen at each opportunity. Let µi be the
mean time before food is realized under X(i).
mr05_Article 2  3/28/05  3:25 PM  Page 86Samuelson: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics 87
Let N(T)b ethe number of renewals (i.e.,
number of units of food) secured by time T.
Then the elementary renewal theorem
(Sheldon Ross (1996, Proposition 3.3.1))
indicates that, as T gets large,
.
As a result, the stationary strategy that
chooses the random variable with the small-
est mean time to renewal (µi) will be approx-
imately optimal (among the set of all
strategies, not just stationary ones), in the
sense that it maximizes the number of
renewals N(T) and hence consumption, for
large values of T. This strategy chooses the
random variable X(i) that maximizes
(2) ,
where t is the renewal time and E{t} µi is its
expected value. In contrast, applications of
hyperbolic discounting in economics typi-
cally assume that people maximize the
expected value of hyperbolically-discounted
utilities. In our simplified case, recalling that
each random delay is terminated by the
appearance of one unit of food, this calls for
maximizing
(3) ,
The objectives given by (2) and (3) can espe-
cially differ if the menu of foraging strategies
includes alternatives with high mean renew-
al times but that attach some probability to
very short waiting times. Such strategies may
fare very well under (3), while being less
attractive under (2).
We thus find that an appeal to our evolu-
tionary background may or may not allow us
to interpret animal evidence as bracing a
belief in human hyperbolic discounting, but
that in the process we also provide evidence
against commonly-used models of (hyper-
bolically discounted) expected utility maxi-
mization. There appears to be no obvious
way to interpret animal experiments as sup-
porting both hyperbolic discounting and
expected utility maximization.









59 One of the puzzles facing biologists is that observed
behavior appears to match the objective given by (3) more
closely than the simple theoretical prediction that (2) be
maximized (Melissa Bateson and Alex Kacelnik (1996),
Kacelnik (1997), Kacelnik and Fausto Brito e Abreu
(1998)).
60 Again, see Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O’Donoghue (2002). Here, as always, there are still ques-
tions of internal validity. Is the observed behavior a prod-
uct of hyperbolic discounting, or something else?  Halevy
(2004) and Ariel Rubinstein (2003) explore alternatives.
Two qualifications are relevant. First,
there are things about animal behavior that
we do not understand.59 More importantly,
the point here is not to defend exponential
discounting. Instead, it would be quite a sur-
prise if discounting were precisely exponen-
tial. There is also evidence of hyperbolic
discounting from human experiments, which
the current discussion does not call into
question.60 The point is that extending
results from animal experiments to conclu-
sions about human behavior raises questions
of external validity that can be examined
through the lens of economic theory. In con-
nection with hyperbolic discounting, the
accompanying theory is not immediately
supportive of a link.
Assessments of external validity can be
further complicated by the fact that the
appropriate external environment for com-
parison is often not obvious. Consider one of
the simplest experimental settings, the dicta-
tor game. Experiments find that dictators
typically do not seize all of the money,
despite the lack of any obvious reason for not
doing so (Davis and Holt 1993; Robert
Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and
Martin Sefton 1995). What should we make
of this result? Each of us is constantly
involved in a version of the dictator game, in
that we constantly have opportunities to give
away the money in our wallets, or anything
else that we own. Typically, however, we
hold on to what is ours. One might then view
the experimental evidence as being
swamped by a mass of practical experience
with the dictator game, in which people for
the most part tend to keep what they have.
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61 For example, people are said to give gifts in anticipa-
tion of reciprocation, to contribute to charity in order to
gain esteem, to tip in order to advertise their generosity to
fellow diners, and so on.
62 For example, the sensitivity of amounts retained by
dictators to the degree of anonymity in the experiment
(Hoffman, McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Smith 1994;
Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996) could be interpreted
as indicating that one purpose of a seemingly altruistic act
is to demonstrate one’s behavior to others.
Then what do the experiments have to
tell us? One message is clear: people do not
always keep everything. This is a useful
point of departure. Outside the laboratory,
people also sometimes relinquish what
they own, giving gifts and making contribu-
tions to charity. A variety of explanations
have been offered for why this seemingly
altruistic behavior is consistent with ration-
al, selfish behavior.61 While often persua-
sive, and consistent with some aspects of
behavior in dictator experiments,62 it
seems a stretch to suggest that such expla-
nations can cover every bit of generosity.
One can then view dictator experiments as
an attempt to strip away the confounding
factors and isolate a situation in which
rational, selfish behavior has a clear predic-
tion, allowing us to conclude that people
are not always relentlessly selfish.
This is instructive, but only the most
extreme would claim that selfish preferences
are a complete description in every circum-
stance. Do the dictator experiments have
anything to contribute beyond challenging
such extremists? Here we return squarely to
the question of what is the appropriate con-
text in which to evaluate the external validi-
ty of dictator experiments. Does the
experimental allocation represent the con-
tinual decisions we implicitly make about
whether to keep our wealth or give it away?
If so, then the findings provide a serious
challenge to the preferences commonly used
in economic models. Does the experiment
capture those rarer circumstances under
which people make anonymous contribu-
tions to charity? If so, then the findings are
commonplace. A useful point of departure in
63 See Cedric A. B. Smith (1961) for an early theoreti-
cal discussion of lottery payoffs, and Roth and Michael W.
K. Malouf (1979), Roth and J. Keith Murnighan (1982),
and Roth and Françoise Schoumaker (1983) for early
experimental applications.
addressing this issue is again theoretical,
aimed at identifying and modeling the fea-
tures that distinguish the first set of circum-
stances from the second, and then
interpreting these circumstances in terms of
experimental designs and findings. Once
again, the general point is that examining the
relevant theory can help assess the interpre-
tation and external validity of experimental
results.
4.2.2 Internal Validity
Experiments in economics typically fea-
ture monetary payoffs. Can we assume that
these monetary payoffs represent utilities?
Section 2 touched on one reason why the
answer might be no, namely that subjects
might care about more than simply the
amount of money they make. However, sup-
pose that this is not the case. If subjects are
risk averse, then monetary payoffs still do
not provide a good representation of utility.
One of the early insights of experimental
economics was that we can effectively elimi-
nate risk aversion, as long as subjects are
expected-utility maximizers. Suppose one
has in mind an experiment that would make
monetary payments ranging from 0 to 100.
Then replace each payoff x∈[0,100] with a
lottery that offers a prize of 100 with proba-
bility x/100 and a prize of zero otherwise.
Expected payoffs are unchanged. However,
for any expected utility maximizer, regard-
less of risk attitudes, the expected utility of a
lottery that pays 100 with probability p (and
0 otherwise) is
This expression is linear in p, meaning that
the agent is risk neutral in the currency of
probabilities. On the strength of this con-
venience, lottery payoffs have often been
used in experimental economics.63
pU p U U U U p 100 1 0 0 100 0 () () ( )() ( ) () [] +− = + − .
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64 Hence, 95U′(w) is an upper bound on the utility of
an extra 95 dollars, and 200U′(w 200) a lower bound on
the utility of an extra 200 dollars. Rabin (2000) contains
additional examples and shows that the argument extends
beyond the particular formulation presented here.
Against this background, Matthew Rabin
(2000) (see also Rabin and Richard H. Thaler
2001) presents an argument that we illustrate
with the following example. Suppose Alice
would rather take $95.00 with certainty than
face a lottery that pays nothing with proba-
bility and $200 with probability . Suppose
further that Alice would make this choice no
matter what her wealth. Then either the
standard model of utility maximization does
not apply, or Alice is absurdly risk averse.
To  see the reasoning behind this argu-
ment, assume that Alice has a differentiable
utility function U(w) over her level of wealth
w, with (at least weakly) decreasing margin-
al utility. Alice’s choice implies that the utili-
ty of an extra 95 dollars is more than half the
utility of an extra 200 dollars. This implies
that 200U (w 200) 95U (w), where w is
Alice’s current wealth and U (w) is the
largest marginal utility found in the interval
[w, w 200] and U (w 200) is the smallest
marginal utility in that interval.64
Simplifying, we have, for any wealth w
(4) .
Now letting w0 be Alice’s initial wealth level
and stringing such inequalities together, it
follows that, for any w, no matter how large,
Alice’s utility U(w) satisfies
…
. = () + ′() Uw U w 00 4000
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where the first inequality breaks [0,∞] into
intervals of length 200 and assumes that
the maximum possible marginal utility
holds throughout each interval, the second
repeatedly uses (4), and the remainder is a
straightforward calculation.
Now consider a loss of 3000. A similar





Comparing these two results, we have that
for any X 0,
.
Hence, there is no positive amount of money
X, no matter how large, that would induce
Alice, no matter how wealthy, to accept a
fifty/fifty lottery of losing 3000 and winning
X. Risk aversion over relatively small stakes
thus implies absurd risk aversion over larger
stakes.
Risk aversion over small stakes seems
quite reasonable and is consistent with labo-
ratory evidence (e.g., Holt and Susan K.
Laury 2002). How do we reconcile this with
the seeming absurdity of the implied behav-
ior over larger stakes? Taking it for granted
that people are not so risk averse over large
stakes, Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler
(2001) suggest that the expected-utility
model should be abandoned.
This conclusion poses a puzzle for experi-
mental practice. The use of lottery payoffs
appears to be either unnecessary (because
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subjects are risk neutral over the relatively
modest sums paid in experiments) or neces-
sarily ineffective (because subjects are risk
averse over small sums, and hence cannot be
expected-utility maximizers). The argument
is even more challenging for economic theo-
ry, where expected-utility maximization is
firmly entrenched.
In response, our attention turns to ques-
tions of internal validity. Is the observed
behavior appropriately interpreted as
reflecting departures from expected-utility
maximization? Addressing this question
requires a more careful look at the theory.
Let X be a set of consequences,   a set of
states, and L a set of acts, where an act is a
function associating a consequence with
each state. Savage (1972) shows that if an
agent has preferences over the set of acts L
satisfying certain axioms, then the agent
chooses as if she has a probability distribu-
tion p over   and a utility function U over X,
and maximizes expected utility.
This theory makes no comment as to
what is contained in the set X over which
utilities are defined (cf. James C. Cox and
Vjollca Sadiraj 2002). The argument that
Alice’s risk aversion over small stakes
implies implausible behavior over large
stakes implicitly assumes that utility is a
function of (only) Alice’s final wealth—the
amount of money she has after the outcome
of the lottery has been realized. Hence,
Alice must view winning a million-dollar
lottery when initially penniless as equiva-
lent to losing $9,000,000 of an initial
$10,000,000. This is the most common way
that expected utility appears in theoretical
models, but nothing in expected utility the-
ory precludes defining utility over pairs of
the form (w, y), where w is an initial wealth
level and y is a gain or loss by which this
wealth level is adjusted. In this case, Alice
may view the two final $1,000,000 out-
comes described above quite differently.
And once this is the case, there need no
longer be any conflict between being an
expected utility maximizer, being risk
65 There is then no inconsistency in believing that
experimental subjects are expected utility maximizers
while using lotteries to control for risk aversion over small
stakes. The evidence on whether lottery payoffs success-
fully control for risk aversion is not entirely encouraging
(e.g., Joyce E. Berg, John W. Dickhaut, and Thomas A.
Rietz 2003; James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca 1995;
Selten, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Klaus Abbink 1999; and
James M. Walker, Smith, and Cox 1990). These findings
present yet another challenge to the presumption that
experimental subjects maximize expected utility.
averse over small stakes, and still behaving
plausibly over larger states.65
This argument can be taken a step further.
Savage (1972, pp. 15–16, 82–91) views expect-
ed utility theory as applicable only to “small-
worlds” problems, in which the sets of states,
consequences and acts are simple enough
that one can identify and explore every impli-
cation of each act. Savage notes that it is
“utterly ridiculous” to encompass all of our
decision-making within a single small-worlds
model (1972, p. 16). Instead, his view (1972,
pp. 82–91) is that decision makers break the
world they face into small chunks that are
simple enough to be approximated with a
small-worlds view. We can expect behavior in
these subproblems to be described by expect-
ed utility theory, but the theory tells us noth-
ing about relationships between behavior
across problems.
Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957,
pp. 299–300) continue this argument, noting
that, “one’s choices for a series of problems—
no matter how simple—usually are not con-
sistent.” They suggest that if one discovers an
inconsistency, one should modify one’s deci-
sions, with “this jockeying—making snap
judgments, checking on their consistency,
modifying them, again checking on consisten-
cy, etc.”, ultimately leading to consistent
expected-utility maximizing behavior. We can
thus expect consistent behavior only across
sets of choices (or worlds) that are sufficient-
ly small that we can expect the required
adjustment to have been made.
Returning to our original setting, the set of
all lotteries may be too large a world to
encompass within a single expected-utility
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formulation. If we define utility in terms of
final wealth levels, Alice’s expected-utility
maximization over small stakes may then not
be consistent with her behavior over large
stakes. But she may nonetheless be maximiz-
ing expected utility, though with a utility
function in which wealth or some other vari-
able indexes different small worlds problems,
each of which is treated via a utility function
over (some subset of) final wealth levels.
This discussion is not to be read as a
defense of expected utility theory. There is
every reason to believe that so stark a theory
cannot always be a good approximation. This
discussion is instead meant to provide a word
of caution in assessing the internal validity of
experimental results. Risk aversion over
small gambles, one of the seemingly most
powerful challenges to the theory, may in
fact be consistent with expected utility.
More importantly, this argument does not
diminish the strength of the small-stakes-
risk-aversion challenge to economic theory.
The evidence remains that we can save
expected utility maximization as a useful the-
ory only if something other than wealth
enters utility functions. As Rubinstein (2001)
notes, this opens the door to all manner of
inconsistencies in decision making.
Expected utility can be defended only by
recognizing that economic theorists have a
great deal of work to do.
Other illustrations of the importance of
theory in assessing internal validity are easi-
ly found. Game-theoretic models featuring
mixed Nash equilibria have been questioned
on the grounds that individual play does not
exhibit the identical, independent random-
ization required by the theory (e.g., James
N. Brown and Robert W. Rosenthal 1990).
But if the mixed equilibrium reflects either a
population polymorphism (as suggested by
John F. Nash 2002) or the result of an adap-
tive process, we would expect such inde-
pendence to fail (e.g., Binmore, Joe
Swierzbinski, and Chris Proulx 2001).
Alternatively, section 2 sketched the dis-
cussion of behavior in bargaining games up
to the appearance of models in which pref-
erences depend upon the vector of all pay-
offs, one’s own as well as the payoffs of
others. Subsequent experiments have sug-
gested that more is involved. Attitudes
towards payoffs appear to depend not only
on the payoffs themselves, but also the con-
text in which these payoffs were generated.
A player is more likely to prefer a larger
opponent payoff if the opponent’s play has
been appropriate (kind, or fair, or generous,
or expected) and more likely to prefer a
smaller opponent payoff if the opponent’s
play has been inappropriate. The experi-
mental evidence has provided evidence for
positive reciprocity (the desire to reward
those who have behaved appropriately)
(Fehr and Simon Gächter 2000; Fehr,
Gächter, and Georg Kirchsteiger 1997;
Kevin A. McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith
1998) and negative reciprocity (the desire
to punish those who have behaved inappro-
priately) (Fehr and Gächter 2002).
However, we can expect subjects’ choices to
reflect a mixture of concerns for one’s own
payoff, inequality aversion, altruism, trust,
and positive and negative reciprocity (cf.
Cox 2004). How do we separate these
forces, i.e., how do we assess the internal
validity of the experiments? Once again, a
useful point of departure is a model of pref-
erences encompassing these forces and
pointing to experiments that will distin-
guish them. Interpreting the experiments is
again likely to rest upon careful theoretical
modeling.
5. The Search for Theory
Where do we look for theoretical devel-
opments that will help integrate economic
theory and experimental economics?
To  approach this question, think of an
experiment as being composed of three
pieces. The game form (recognizing that the
“game” may include only a single-player)
specifies the rules of play, including the
number and characteristics of the players,
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66 Jörgen W. Weibull (2004) introduces the concept of a
game protocol, though drawing a somewhat different line
between the game form and game protocol.
the choices available to the players, their
timing and sequence, the information avail-
able to the players, the resulting conse-
quences, and so on. To this, one adds a
specification of how the outcomes are trans-
lated into utilities. It would typically be con-
venient if the monetary payoffs given by the
game form could also be taken to represent
players’ utilities, but this need not be the
case. Let us refer to a game form and its
associated utilities as a game protocol or sim-
ply protocol, and let us think of the “default”
protocol as equating monetary payoffs and
utilities.66 The third piece of the triad is a
theory describing the behavior one would
expect, given the game protocol.
In some cases, the game protocol leaves
little to the discretion of the theory. If the
protocol combines the dictator game with
the assumption that monetary payoffs are
equivalent to utilities, then a theory based on
rational behavior leaves no room for maneu-
ver: dictators must keep all of the money.
Similarly, if the protocol pairs the ultimatum
game with the assumption that monetary
payoffs are utilities, then sequential rational-
ity uniquely determines the implications of
the theory. In other cases, the protocol
leaves much to the discretion of the theory.
Work on equilibrium refinements grew out
of the fact that even if one restricts attention
to relatively simple games and assumes that
the payoffs are indeed utilities, sequential
rationality in general puts relatively few
restrictions on behavior.
Now consider how one might react if an
economic theory and experimental results
are consistently at odds. One possibility is
that the theory should be refined, or
extended, or altered, or abandoned. For
example, the equilibrium refinements liter-
ature culminated in models of equilibrium
selection centered around notions of for-
ward induction. The experimental evidence
67 See, for example, Dieter Balkenborg (1994); Jordi
Brandts and Holt (1992, 1993, 1995); and Cooper, Susan
Garvin, and Kagel (1997, 1997).
68 Weibull (2004) stresses the possibility that an experi-
ment’s monetary payoffs may not capture subjects’ prefer-
ences and discusses the resulting difficulties involved in
drawing inferences from experiments. Roth (1991) notes
that, given the difficulty in controlling every aspect of 
subjects’ preferences and expectations, it is hard to know
precisely what game is involved in an experimental study.
has not been particularly supportive of for-
ward induction,67 suggesting that theories
based on forward induction could well be
reconsidered.
In other cases, there is little to be gained
by looking for alternative theories while
maintaining the game protocol. In the bar-
gaining games in section 2, for example,
there appears to be no way to account for the
observed behavior while clinging to a model
based on rationality and the default protocol.
The result, as we have seen, has been a flur-
ry of work developing alternative models of
preferences.68
We return to the modeling of prefer-
ences in section 5.2. First, however, section
5.1 considers another possible response
when examining a protocol. There may be
good reasons to question whether the game
form perceived by the subjects matches
that embedded in the experimental game
protocol.
5.1 Perceived Protocols
How could subjects help but perceive the
proper game form? The potential behavior
in an experiment is typically tightly con-
trolled, including quite precise rules for who
gets to make what choices at what times. As
noted in section 3.2, a great advantage of
experiments is the ability to control these
details. In assessing the effects of these con-
trols, however, we return to the idea that
people, including experimental subjects, use
models to make decisions.
Just as economists are forced to rely on
models in their analysis, so can we expect
people to rely on models when making their
decisions. Given the many choices people
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69 How long would it take to get through the grocery
store if every detail of every purchase were analyzed?
70 Section 3.1 touched on the question of whether there
is an objective reality (cf. note 11). The point here is that,
regardless of whether there is, models of this reality are
subjective.
have to make in their everyday lives, most
without the time and resources that econo-
mists devote to a problem, we cannot expect
people to make use of all of the information
in their environment.69 Instead, most
aspects of most decisions are ignored
because they are not important enough to
bother with. In essence, people use models,
stripping away unimportant considerations
to focus on more important ones.
Similarly, we should expect experimental
subjects to respond to the novelty of an
experimental setting by modeling its key fea-
tures. This need to rely on models when ana-
lyzing the real world ensures that
researchers and experimental subjects both
introduce a subjective element into their
perceptions.70 Using the notation developed
above, an experiment is designed to fix an
experimental design x
N. The experiment
itself, however, is a situation x∞ with the
property that x∞(n) x
N(n) for n 1,…, N.
The choice of the aspects of the situation to
bring within the experimental design, cap-
tured by N, represents the experimenter’s
model of the situation. Suppose that an
experimental subject, confronted with the
situation  x∞, similarly constructs a model.
This model is itself a choice of finitely many
dimensions of the infinitely-dimensioned x∞
to take into consideration. Is there any rea-
son to expect the subject’s model to coincide
with the experimenter’s, i.e., to expect the
subject to hit upon the same choice of salient
information as did the experimenter?
We may often be able to expect the subject
to come close. The experiment is typically
designed so as to focus attention on x
N.
However, it would be surprising if the two
models matched exactly. We thus run the risk
that subjects may ignore aspects of the situa-
tion that the experimenter deems critical or
71 Psychologists frequently run experiments based on the
premise (often with the help of some deception) that the
experimenter and subject will perceive different protocols.
72 This raises the question of when we can expect les-
sons learned in one context to transfer to other contexts.
Such transfer will presumably be more effective the
greater is the extent to which people learn not only which
behavior works well, but also the reasons why the behavior
works well. Cooper and Kagel (2003) provide an introduc-
tion to work on generalizing learning across contexts.
that the subjects may introduce aspects that
the experimenter deems irrelevant.71
An illustration is provided by Douglas
Dyer and John H. Kagel (1996). Their
research is motivated by the observation that
experimental subjects frequently bid too
aggressively in common-value auctions.
Even subjects who are experienced, profes-
sional bidders in auctions for construction
contracts fall prey to the winner’s curse in
laboratory experiments.
Dyer and Kagel note that the auctions in
which the professionals routinely bid contain
some potentially important features that did
not appear in the laboratory experiments.
For example, the real-world auctions typical-
ly allowed bidders to withdraw winning bids,
without cost, when these bids contain mis-
takes that are formally characterized as
“arithmetic errors” but in practice are
allowed to cover virtually any request to
withdraw a bid (on the principal that one
does not want a contractor who does not
want the job). As a result, the winner can
withdraw a bid that is revealed (by compari-
son with other bids) to be too optimistic,
providing some protection against the win-
ner’s curse. It appears as if the bidders have
developed rules of behavior that are effec-
tive in the context with which they are famil-
iar, though perhaps without completely
identifying the key features of the environ-
ment that make these rules work well. In
bringing the resulting rules into the experi-
ment, the subjects are reacting to a per-
ceived protocol that appears to be familiar,
but with results that appear to be anomalous
when held to the standard of the protocol
chosen by the experimenter.72
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73 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (2000, 2000) report
experiments showing that behavior may be counterintu-
itively nonmonotonic in the scale of monetary payments,
with (for example) the incidence of late pickups at a day-
care center increasing as the cost increases from zero to a
small amount, but then being deterred by higher costs.
Their interpretation is that the increase from zero to a pos-
itive cost causes agents to think about the interaction dif-
ferently. In our terms, attention has been focused on
different aspects of the situation, triggering the use of a
different analytical model.
74 There is a rich body of work in biology on plant and
animal signaling. See Alan Grafen (1990a, 1990b) and
Rufus A. Johnstone and Grafen (1992) for theoretical
models; H. C. J. Godfray and Johnstone (2000) and
Johnstone (1998) for surveys; and Johnstone (1995) for an
examination of the evidence.
75 See Malte Andersson (1982), J. Hoglund, M.
Eriksson, and L. E. Lindell (1990), and Anders Møller
(1988) for examples of similar experiments.
The general principle is that, just as sub-
jects in an experiment may face effective
payoffs that differ from those of the game
protocol, so might they effectively play a dif-
ferent game. Our interpretation of experi-
mental results can then depend importantly
on how we imagine subjects perceive the
game.73
A hypothetical illustration will be helpful.
Suppose that biologists were interested in a
theory that female birds preferred males
with long tails, and that they did so rational-
ly because long tails were a signal of other
characteristics that make a mate particularly
desirable.74 To  test this theory, an experi-
ment is designed in which some males have
plastic feathers glued to their tails.75
Suppose that females indeed flock to the
males with now strikingly long tails. How do
we interpret the results? A biologist is likely
to claim that the experimental results pro-
vide support for the theory. However, one
can well imagine an economist claiming just
the opposite, that the theory has been
demonstrated to be nonsense. After all, the
theory is founded on the presumption of
rational behavior. This seems obviously
inconsistent with exhibiting a preference for
males with plastic tails, since the latter can-
not be associated with the characteristics
that make males desirable mates.
76 Again, there may be a biological basis for such tastes.
See, for example, Bobbi S. Low, R. D. Alexander, and K.
M. Noonan (1987) and Matt Ridley (1993).
These differing conclusions are grounded
in different assumptions about how the sub-
jects perceive the experiment. The biologist
assumes that the subject will not perceive
the difference between a real tail and a plas-
tic one or, in our terms, that the subject’s
model of the experiment does not accommo-
date plastic tails. The typical assumption in
economic contexts is that, provided the
experiment is sufficiently transparent and
effectively presented, the subjects’ model of
the experiment matches the experimental
design.
The example of plastic tails may seem a bit
removed from human experiments. Suppose
instead that the hypothesis in question is that
human males are attracted to females with
“hourglass” figures.76 An experimenter tests
this by showing males a variety of porno-
graphic pictures, checking which females
prompt the most enthusiastic reaction. Many
males are responsive to pornography, and
many will be especially responsive to
females with the appropriate figure. A biolo-
gist or psychologist is again likely to interpret
the experimental results as support for the
theory. Once more, however, one can imag-
ine economists interpreting the results as
another blow to the contention that people
(or at least males) behave rationally. How
can they be rational if they react the same
way to fictitious females as to real ones?
An alternative interpretation is that peo-
ple behave rationally, but that they use mod-
els that do not incorporate a distinction that
the experimenter takes for granted. Just as
birds may have a model of the world that
makes no provision for plastic tails, so may
people have models that do not distinguish
perfectly between real and fictitious females
(though obviously also not treating the two
identically). Why might people persist in
using such models? We turn to this question
in section 5.2. Before doing so, one more
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77 Returning to the question raised in section 2, what do
subjects have to learn in the ultimatum game? Perhaps
that its futureless nature distinguishes it from other, more
familiar situations, and accordingly calls for different
behavior (and that enough others have also learned this).
example is useful, pushing the setting yet
closer to traditional economic experiments.
Return to the point of departure for sec-
tion 2, the ultimatum game. A key compo-
nent of the game form is that the proposer
and responder will have no subsequent inter-
actions. Experimenters have gone to great
lengths to ensure that subjects understand
this, including most notably ensuring that the
subjects interact anonymously. But can we
preclude the possibility that subjects model
the situation as if there is some possibility of
future interaction? If not, then the observed
behavior might be consistent with rationality,
without requiring any modification in how
we model preferences.77
Fehr and Joseph Henrich (2003) shed
some light on this “phantom future” expla-
nation, pointing to experimental studies
comparing behavior with and without the
prospect of future interaction. For example,
experimental behavior in one-shot and
repeated games is markedly different (e.g.,
Fehr and Gächter 2000 and Gächter and
Armin Falk 2002). As Fehr and Henrich
note, this provides evidence that the inabili-
ty to correctly account for the future is not a
plausible explanation for the observed
behavior. These results help fill in one piece
of the puzzle, but leave some more to be
explored. The experiments strongly suggest
that people do not treat every situation as if
it has the same prospects for subsequent
interaction. It then remains to ask whether
subjects may still model each situation as if
there is some prospect of future interaction,
perhaps on the strength of some reasoning
to the effect that one can never absolutely
preclude any possibility, while still recogniz-
ing that games with an explicit future are dif-
ferent than games without. The idea behind
this middle ground is that people may not
perfectly model one-shot interactions, while
78 Samuelson (2001) provides one example, in which
the use of models makes an explicit appearance. Also see
Philippe Jehiel (2004).
79 See Robyn M. Dawes (1988) for an early discussion
of framing effects.
still recognizing and acting on the fact that
the likelihood of future interaction is quite
different in different situations (just as males
may recognize that they are not dealing with
real females when consuming pornography,
and yet have a reaction to the latter shaped
by their reaction to real females).
At this point, this possibility is a hypothe-
sis awaiting further exploration and experi-
mentation. Before expecting too much such
experimentation, however, we must ask for
some theoretical guidance on how people
model the situations they face. What behav-
ior could we observe that would bolster our
belief in such an explanation, or that would
call it into question? In essence, we need a
theory of how people use theories in shaping
their behavior. This is a relatively new but
important direction for economic theory.78
The implication is that models of subjects’
perceptions of experimental game forms
should take their place alongside models of
preferences in explaining behavior. We see
evidence for an important role in the way
subjects perceive experimental protocols in
the importance of framing effects.79 Why do
seemingly innocuous differences in the
description of a protocol make such a differ-
ence? Presumably because they prompt sub-
jects to use different models in analyzing the
experiment.
This perspective suggests that some cau-
tion is called for when working with espe-
cially complicated experiments, not simply
because it may tax the abilities of the sub-
jects (as stressed by Binmore 1999), but also
because it may expand the range of models
that subjects apply to the experiment. At the
same time, Harrison and John A. List (2004)
caution that the context-free framing of
many experiments, designed to eliminate
potentially confounding factors, may instead
simply invite subjects to impose their own
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80 Camerer and Keith Weigelt (1988) conduct an early
experimental analysis of reputation models. Their results
exhibit many features of reputation equilibria, but their
subjects also appear to have a “homemade prior” about the
information structure that is at odds with a strict interpre-
tation of the experimental environment. It appears as if the
subjects have provided a context for the experiment.
81 In the context of the hourglass-figure experiment dis-
cussed above, one can imagine an experimenter adding a
variety of additional controls to ensure that the subjects
understand that pornographic females are not real, per-
haps stressing this in the instructions and quizzing the sub-
jects on the difference. But this is news to no one, and is
unlikely to eliminate the effect.
context.80 Despite an experimenter’s best
efforts to ensure that subjects understand
what they are dealing with, including careful
presentations, questions, and preliminary
quizzes, it is not clear when we can be confi-
dent that the subjects’ models match the
experimenter’s.81
In many cases, it will be difficult to distin-
guish whether unexpected behavior is root-
ed in subjects’ payoffs or their perception of
the game form. A tendency to analyze the
ultimatum game with a model that implicitly
builds in a future may give results that look
as if an agent has a preference for fairness or
an antipathy for asymmetric solutions. This
may be more than a coincidence. As argued
in Samuelson (2004), a likely response by
Nature to limitations on our reasoning abili-
ty, the same sort of limitations that prompt
our use of models, may be to compensate by
building arguments into our preferences
that we would not expect to find when
agents are perfectly rational. Hence, the two
arguments are likely to be complementary
rather than contradictory. Then how do we
choose between them, or what use is there
in considering both? These questions again
suggest a quest for richer theoretical models.
5.2 Evolutionary Foundations
One difficulty in modeling preferences is
that once we move beyond a narrow concep-
tion of self-interest, there appear to be few
restrictions on the features we can attribute
to preferences, and hence the behavior we
can explain (cf. Andrew Postlewaite 1998).
82 This distinguishes this exercise from the bulk of what
has come to be known as “evolutionary game theory” or
“evolutionary economics.” These latter bodies of (quite
diverse) work share the guiding principle that instead of
optimizing, people reach decisions and markets reach out-
comes through an adaptive process involving varying
degrees of learning, experimentation, and trial-and-error.
“Evolution” is a metaphor for this adaptive process.
83 This view is familiar in evolutionary psychology, (e.g.,
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby 1992), and has ample
precedent in economics (e.g., Arthur J. Robson 1992,
1996, 1996, 2001a, 2001b).
84 Just as economists are adept at building models, evo-
lutionary psychologists have been criticized for seemingly
being able to rationalize any behavior with an evolutionary
model. Steven Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin (1979)
find these models sufficiently unpersuasive as to be
deemed “just-so stories.” If the evolutionary approach is to
be successful, it must do more than provide such stories.
85 Terry Burnham and Jay Phelan (2000) contains a
wealth of examples.
Where do we find the discipline to ensure
that our models are meaningful? This dan-
ger seems all the more real once we open
the door to the possibility that subjects may
form their own models of the experimental
situation. Where do we look for a theory of
peoples’ models of the world?
This section suggests an evolutionary
approach to both questions. The idea is to
view evolution as the biological process by
which humans came to their modern form.82
This modern form includes a host of physical
characteristics—our size, our relative lack of
hair, our ability to walk upright— and behav-
ioral characteristics—our diet—that we
readily attribute to the forces of evolution.
We can also expect our preferences and our
decision-making to have been the products
of evolution.83 The result is a “reverse engi-
neering” approach to studying decision mak-
ing. Can we plausibly make a case that a
given specification of preferences, or rules
for how situations are modeled and translat-
ed into decisions, might have evolved as part
of a solution to an evolutionary design prob-
lem? The more easily one finds such evolu-
tionary foundations, the more seriously
should we be inclined to take the model in
question.84
Evolutionary research abounds in mal-
adaption stories.85 One first identifies a
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86 For a simple example, it is likely that during most of
our evolutionary history, food was both in chronically short
supply and could be stored only in the form of body fat. As
a result, it appears likely that an evolutionarily successful
strategy was to eat as much as possible whenever possible.
It is then no surprise that members of modern, wealthy
societies find it difficult to avoid health-threatening
overeating.
87 The model of cultural group selection avoids many of
the difficulties that have made biologists skeptical of group
selection arguments. Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson
(1998) argue that group selection lies behind preferences
for altruism.
behavior that is likely to have been an opti-
mal response to the environment in which
we evolved. One then notes that our mod-
ern environment is quite different, causing
the behavior to now be quite surprising, if
not counterproductive.86 In contrast, our
concern here is with behavior that evolu-
tion has designed as an optimal response to
our environment, recognizing that this is an
environment in which we must rely on
preferences and on models in making our
decisions.
There is a growing body of work on how
our evolutionary background may have
shaped our preferences. Perhaps best devel-
oped is the link between reproduction and
risk taking, and hence the implications for
attitudes toward risk (Arthur J. Robson
1992, 1996). Much of this material is nicely
covered in Robson (2001a).
More recently, experimental evidence has
mounted that people will incur costs not
only to bestow benefits on others, but also to
penalize others, with the preference for
reward or punishment hinging upon percep-
tions of whether the recipient has acted
appropriately or inimically. What might be
the evolutionary origins of such “prosocial”
behavior? Henrich (2004) offers an explana-
tion based on cultural group selection.87 An
advantage of this model is that it provides
the type of discipline required for further
investigation. For example, the model sug-
gests that we should expect multiple cultur-
al equilibria, and hence considerable
variation across cultures in the tendency to
88 In connection with the first feature, it is intriguing
that the study of bargaining behavior in fifteen small-scale
societies by Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr,
Gintis, and McElreath (2001) finds significant behavioral
variation.
89 For example, if given a collection of cards with num-
bers on one side and letters on the other, along with the
hypothesis that any card with a 3 on one side has a B on the
other, and then shown four cards bearing 3, 7, A and B,
only a minority correctly identify which cards must be
turned over to check the hypothesis.
90 For example, told that a coke-drinker, beer-drinker,
17-year-old and 25-year-old are seated at a table, virtually
every subject knows which ones to check for compliance
with a 21-year-old drinking law.
91 See Cosmides and Tooby (1992). The ability to rec-
ognize faces (Steven Pinker 1997) is similarly interpreted as
an evolutionary response to the importance of monitoring
others’ behavior.
bestow benefits and costs on others. Second,
a propensity to imitate or conform to the
behavior of others plays an important role in
the model, suggesting we look for a link
between such behavior and prosocial behav-
ior. Third, evolution is viewed as facing
information constraints, so that we must in
turn view preferences as tools for maximiz-
ing fitness while economizing on informa-
tion. These features may be consistent with
a variety of other models, and so they cannot
be the end of the quest, but they provide a
useful point of departure.88
Work on how evolution has shaped the
way people model their environment is in an
even earlier stage. Three illustrations will be
useful.
First, the Wason selection test (1966) is
now a standard example in evolutionary
psychology. Experimental subjects are sur-
prisingly prone to errors in evaluating
abstract conditional statements.89 But if
asked to evaluate conditional statements
posed in terms of monitoring compliance
with a standard of behavior, success is
much higher.90 The suggested interpreta-
tion is that our reasoning about conditional
statements evolved in a setting in which
monitoring behavior was particularly
important.91 This interpretation bolsters an
argument of Fehr and Henrich (2003), that
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92 The maladaption account of such behavior would be
that we evolved in an environment in which repeated or
kinship interactions, and hence the optimality of reciproc-
ity, were sufficiently pervasive that there was no point in
checking whether such behavior is warranted. However, it
is not clear that our evolutionary past would have
equipped us with a basic propensity to monitor for and
detect cheating in an environment in which it was unim-
portant to distinguish situations meriting reciprocity from
those that do not.
93 See Cosmides and Tooby (1996), Gerd Gigerenzer
(1991, 1996, 1998), and Tversky and Kahneman (1983).
For example, when told that 2 percent of the population
has a disease and that a test produces no false negatives
but 5 percent false positives, many subjects will struggle to
ascertain the implications of a positive report. However,
they fare better when told that out of every thousand peo-
ple, all twenty who have the disease turn up positive but so
do fifty others.
laboratory behavior exhibiting reciprocity
should not be interpreted as an evolution-
ary maladaption.92 At the same time, how-
ever, it raises the possibility that subjects’
perceived protocols may not correctly 
capture incentives if their presentation is
sufficiently unfamiliar.
Second, a variety of evidence suggests that
people are not very good in dealing with
probabilities. However, there is also evi-
dence that people fare much better when
probabilities are presented in terms of fre-
quencies.93 This may indicate that we spent
much of our history with a frequentist view
of the world. This is consistent with the pos-
sibility that people are approximately
expected utility maximizers, while perform-
ing quite poorly in laboratory experiments, if
the latter present probabilistic information
unfamiliarly.
Third, Plott (1996) presents the “discov-
ered preference hypothesis,” suggesting
that rather than coming to a decision prob-
lem with fixed and well defined prefer-
ences, people respond by combining
contextual information and experience with
an internal search process to discover their
preferences. Similar ideas appear in Dan
Ariely, George Loewenstein, and Drazen
Prelec’s (2003) notion of “constructed” pref-
erences, which they illustrate with a number
94 For example, they find that, if subjects are first asked
whether they would be willing to purchase a product at a
price equal to the last two digits of their social security
number, and are then asked their valuation of the product,
there is significant correlation between their social securi-
ty numbers and reported valuations. The suggested inter-
pretation is that the subjects subconsciously use the
numbers involved in the first purchase decision as clues to
the appropriate valuation in the second. This reliance on
contextual information may work well in many applica-
tions, but leads to apparently absurd behavior in the
experiment.
95 Evolutionary psychologists find evidence for con-
straints on evolution’s ability to simply enhance our rea-
soning powers and dispense with these devices in the
relatively large amount of energy required to maintain the
human brain (Katharine Milton 1988), the high risk of
maternal death in childbirth posed by infants’ large heads
(W. Leutenegger 1982), and the similarly-caused lengthy
period of human postnatal development (Paul H. Harvey,
R. D. Martin, and T. H. Clutton-Brock 1986). Andy Clark
(1993) discusses the potential advantages of using contex-
tual clues and specialized rules to conserve on generalized
reasoning resources.
of experiments.94 These results initially
seem to strike at the core of economic theo-
ry, calling into question the idea of stable
preferences. Notice, however, that the
process by which preferences are discov-
ered or constructed sounds much like the
process Luce and Raiffa (1957) describe as
the foundation for expected utility maxi-
mization (cf. section 4.2.2). Rather than sug-
gesting that we abandon expected utility
theory, the experimental results again
remind us that the theory may not be as
straightforward as one would like. We can
expect consistent behavior in settings
amenable to small-worlds modeling, but
must expect anomalies to appear in other
situations. In terms of experiments, the
implication is again that behavior may be
quite sensitive to seemingly irrelevant
details of the experimental environment.
What is the common theme of these three
examples? Echoing the ideas that opened
section 5.1, it is that evolution has equipped
us with a variety of models and rules and
shortcuts for dealing with a dauntingly com-
plex world.95 The possibility the people do
not perfectly model futureless protocols may
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then arise not because evolution has erro-
neously designed us for a different environ-
ment, but because evolution has effectively
designed us for an environment in which
such shortcuts are valuable.
The first two examples are concerned with
techniques for processing information. The
third reflects a spillover into preferences,
bringing us back to the fact that information
constraints also feature in models of prefer-
ence evolution. Samuelson and Jeroen
Swinkels (2001) consider the relationship
between these, examining the implications
for preferences of an evolutionary process
that must cope with scarce reasoning
resources. The conclusion is that we can
expect a variety of seemingly nonstandard
features to be built into our preferences in
response to imperfections and limitations in
our information processing and reasoning.
What are the implications for economics?
We  can often expect people to act consis-
tently and rationally, given their prefer-
ences. However, the preferences involved in
the resulting optimizing behavior may
involve all sorts of features that at first blush
do not appear consistent with either the pur-
suit of individual self-interest or a narrow
concept of consistency. Finally, we can
expect context to be important. In this
sense, evolution and the axiomatic
approaches of Savage (1972) and Luce and
Raiffa (1957) are on the same page. Both
suggest that we can expect consistent behav-
ior within sufficiently constrained contexts,
though with preferences that may appear to
go beyond a narrow conception of self-inter-
est, but that the context will be important
and that seeming anomalies may readily
arise across contexts.
Smith (2003) argues that we can usefully
view human behavior in terms of two types
of rationality, “constructivist” and “ecologi-
cal” rationality. Constructivist rationality
resembles the rational choice models of
traditional economic theory, though again
allowing the possibility that preferences
might reflect more than a narrow self-
96 For example, Jack L. Knetsch, Fang-Fang Tang, and
Thaler (2003), who also provide references to earlier work,
comment that “The endowment effect and loss aversion
have been among the most robust findings of the psychol-
ogy of decision making. People commonly value losses
much more than commensurate gains . . . ” (2001, p. 257).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stress that people view
gains and losses quite differently.
interest, while ecological rationality is con-
cerned with “the possible intelligence
embodied in the rules, norms, and institu-
tions of our cultural and biological her-
itage....” (2003, p. 470). The argument here
ties these concepts together with the vision
of an evolutionary process that struggles
with the constraints imposed by scarce rea-
soning resources. The quest to maximize
fitness generates a motivation for behavior
to reflect constructionist rationality, while
the quest to relax constraints leads to the
ready incorporation of ecological forces.
What are the implications for combining
economic theory and experiments? A first
one is that we must be careful in assessing
both experimental findings and economic
theory. For example, numerous experi-
ments have found that subjects are willing
to pay less to receive an object than they are
willing to accept to relinquish the object.
Some have interpreted this as reflecting a
common feature of preferences, being an
illustration of the more general principle
that people value losses more heavily than
gains.96 However, as Plott and Kathryn
Zeiler (2003) argue, there have also been
many cases in which such discrepancies do
not appear, and one can identify experi-
mental settings in which the effect reliably
does or does not appear. This suggests that
we should stop short of proclaiming the
endowment effect a universal feature of
preferences, and focuses attention on the
internal validity of the experiments. What
links do we draw between differences in
experimental settings and the forces that
shape valuations? At the same time, it indi-
cates that something is missing from our
theoretical repertoire, which currently
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provides little insight into such forces. A
first step in addressing this issue would
then be the construction of theoretical
models, especially models shedding insight
into how and when it might have been evo-
lutionarily valuable to condition valuations
on ownership.
6. Conclusion
Economic theory and economic experi-
ments can be combined to the benefit of
both. By itself, this is a fairly uninformative
“more is better” conclusion. There must be
gains from considering experiments or theo-
ry more carefully when doing theory or
experimentation. But what steps can we take
to make it more likely that potential gains
are realized?
The danger with the concerns raised in
this essay is that they might be used to apol-
ogize away any potential interaction
between theory and experiments. It is
unlikely that we will usefully combine theo-
ry and experiments if we too freely respond
to contrasts between the two with such state-
ments as: “The results appear to be at odds
with the theory, but we have no obvious way
to measure how far away they are, and by my
preferred measure they are pretty close.” 
“ … but I suspect the subjects really per-
ceived a different experimental protocol
under which their behavior is consistent
with the theory.” “ … but the theory is an
approximation that cannot be expected to
apply everywhere, and the discovery of this
exception tells us nothing about the theory
in other applications.” How do we avoid
working at such cross-purposes?
A good beginning would be for exercises
in economic theory to routinely identify
behavior that would be consistent with the
theory, and especially behavior that would
distinguish the theory from contending
explanations. Section 3.1 noted that predict-
ing behavior is not the only goal of econom-
ic theory, and so we cannot expect all
theoretical exercises to be in a position to
97 For example, the theory of utility maximization occu-
pies a prized place at the center of economics. However,
the theory has very little predictive content. Given the
freedom to define preferences, virtually any behavior can
be reconciled with expected-utility maximization. Even
apparent violations of the axioms of revealed preference
can often be apologized away by noting that the data con-
sist of choices made at different times and thus while the
decision-maker is in different states, and hence possibly
described by different preferences. Predictions then
require some augmenting or extension of the revealed-
preference axioms, as in Cox (1997).
point to such behavior.97 We must also allow
the possibility that making connections to
behavior is a goal that the theory will often
not yet be sufficiently advanced to address.
But at some point some connections must be
made between theory and behavior if eco-
nomic theory is not to fade into either phi-
losophy or mathematics, and work that
aspires to make this connection should be
explicit about the implied behavior. In the
course of doing so, it would be helpful to
have some idea not only of the expected
behavior itself, but also of how much noise
we might expect to surround this behavior.
Perhaps more importantly, it would be
useful for theory to identify behavior for
which the theory cannot account, in the
sense that the observations would force the
theorist to reconsider. This would ensure
that the theory is not performing well by
“theorizing to the test,” as in section 4.1.1.
The behavior relegated to this category
might further be grouped in two categories.
One, recognizing that theories can be useful
without applying universally, would identify
situations that are not a good match for the
theory and in which contrary behavior would
not shake one’s confidence in the usefulness
of the theory. The second would consist of
behavior that would force reconsideration of
the theory. The strength of a theory will often
be reflected in the content of this latter cate-
gory, and we might move toward an explicit
examination of what makes a theory useful.
Similarly, it would be helpful to have the
experimental design indicate which out-
comes would be regarded as a failure as well
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as which would be considered a success.
This question appears to be trivial in many
cases, with success and failure riding on the
statistical significance of an estimated
parameter. However, one of the advantages
of experimental work is the ability to control
the environment and design the tests. This
allows us to direct attention away from issues
of statistical significance and toward issues of
economic importance. The strength of the
experiment will often be reflected in the
content of this “failure” category.
Finally, again returning to section 4.1.1, it
is important that both theoretical models
and interpretations of experimental results
be precise enough to apply beyond the
experimental situation from which they
emerge. This allows links to be made that
multiply the power of single studies.
7. Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Given the design x
N, the experi-
ment induces a true probability distribution
π∗∈ S
M over elements s
M of the set S
M,
while the theory f induces a probability dis-
tribution f∗∈  S
M over elements π of the
set  S
M. Given f∗ and π∗, let
.
H(f∗, π∗)is thus the probability the theory is
accepted. Let fπ* be a measure over  S
M that
puts probability one on the true distribution
π∗. Then, from the assumption that T
accepts the truth with probability 1  , we
have, for any π∗,
(5) .
We need to show there exists an 
such that, for all 
(6) ,
where πsM is a probability distribution over
S
M that puts unitary probability on outcome
Hf
sM




M ∈  
Hf
     ∗
∗ () ≥− , 1




∗∗ () () () ∫∫ ,    
 
Hf
∗∗ () = , 
s
M. Using the definition of a maximum for








Using (8) to replace the first term in (7) and
deleting the middle term then gives
(9)          ,
and hence, there is an fˆ such that, for all
,
which, from (6), is the desired result.
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